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 2145 
MAKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRIVATE 
AGAIN: REFERRAL AUTHORITY AND 
RIGHTS ROLLBACK IN MATTER OF A-B- 
Abstract: In the 1960s and 1970s, the women’s movement brought the issue of 
domestic violence to the forefront of American consciousness. In the decades to 
follow, the United States expressed a commitment to protecting victims of do-
mestic violence through legislation and reform that reframed the issue as a matter 
of state concern, rather than merely a private dispute. U.S. asylum law, in con-
trast, has failed to express a parallel commitment to protecting domestic violence 
victims. In 2018, in Matter of A-B-, then-acting Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
invoked his referral authority to overturn precedent from 2014 that recognized 
domestic violence as an asylum-worthy form of persecution. In the process, A.G. 
Sessions characterized domestic violence as a private injury, rather than a public 
harm. This Note examines the scope of that decision and argues that the current 
lack of substantive asylum protections, combined with the Attorney General’s un-
restricted referral authority, leaves domestic violence victims seeking asylum 
particularly vulnerable. Further, this Note proposes procedural reform to curb the 
Attorney General’s referral authority and promote a more fair and participatory 
system for asylum adjudication. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his 1972 film, The Godfather, Francis Ford Coppola portrays a horrific 
scene of domestic violence.1 After Connie Corleone presumably discovers her 
husband is having an affair, she erupts emotionally and physically, smashing 
nearby objects that bind her to domesticity: china plates, eggs, and bread.2 In 
response, her husband unleashes a flow of verbal and physical abuse as he 
stalks his pregnant wife around the house, striking her repeatedly with his 
belt.3 In the scene’s violent culmination, Connie’s husband corners her in the 
bathroom and shuts the door on the public viewer, effectively creating a pri-
vate, unseen space in which the viewer can only imagine the abuse will merci-
lessly continue.4 
Around the same time that Coppola’s blockbuster film brought Connie’s 
domestic abuse to public audiences—while also shielding them from the worst 
of the abuse—the United States experienced a dramatic shift in both its social 
                                                                                                                           
 1 THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. Although Connie and her husband disappear behind the bathroom door, the viewer can still 
hear Connie’s cries and the relentless sound of belt against body. Id. 
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and legal conception of domestic violence.5 In the wake of the women’s 
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, state and federal legislators enacted a series 
of comprehensive laws to protect victims of domestic violence in the United 
States.6 This legislation, along with similar laws enacted in the decades to fol-
low, reflected a national recognition that the state has a role in protecting vic-
tims, who are overwhelmingly female, from violence in the domestic realm.7 
In sharp contrast, U.S. asylum law has been reluctant to implement sub-
stantive legal protections for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.8 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id.; see Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, in THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 165, 166 (Karen J. Maschke ed., 
1997) (describing the interactive relationship between cultural and societal perceptions of domestic 
violence and the substantive law in place to protect victims); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of 
Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 36, 
40–41 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (explaining that in the United 
States, police and courts have historically relegated domestic violence to the private sphere, deeming 
the issue not serious or criminal enough to merit intervention). Historically, the division between 
public and private spheres has influenced the construction of gender roles, with women occupying the 
private sphere and men occupying the public. Schneider, supra, at 37–38; see also Wendy W. Wil-
liams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 151, 153 (1992) (explaining that, under the separate spheres theory, the husband acted as the 
public face of the couple and the breadwinner, and the wife occupied the private world of the family). 
The battered women’s movement drove policy and legislative changes to re-cast the issue of domestic 
violence as a public, rather than a private concern. Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and 
Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 9–
11 (2013). 
 6 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 7. For example, in the 1970s, states began to enact laws enabling 
women to obtain civil protective orders, preventing perpetrators of domestic violence from further 
abusing victims. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domes-
tic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1667. By the mid-1990s, all fifty states had introduced 
civil protection order statutes. Id. 
 7 Sack, supra note 6, at 1667; see ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that variations in the definition of “domes-
tic violence” account in part for a lack of generally accepted statistics regarding the prevalence of 
domestic violence). Statistics consistently reveal that women are far more likely to be victims of do-
mestic violence than men. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra, at 10 (reporting, for example, that 84% of 
victims of spousal abuse are women). Given an increased societal awareness of the issue since the 
women’s movement, a variety of sources have begun to track statistics about violence against women. 
Id. After the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA, or the Act), for example, the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office on Violence Against Women began to gather statistics from 
federal, state, and private sources. Id. In 1994, VAWA became the first major federal legislation dedi-
cated to protecting women against domestic violence and provided both civil and criminal causes of 
action. Id. at 1, 24; see also Joe Biden, 20 Years of Change: Joe Biden on the Violence Against Wom-
en Act, TIME (Sept. 10, 2014), http://time.com/3319325/joe-biden-violence-against-women/ [https://
perma.cc/46R8-GFR7] (commemorating the twentieth anniversary of VAWA and characterizing the 
Act as a recognition of the basic right of women in America to “be free from violence and free from 
fear”). 
 8 T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for Asylum in United States Immigration 
Law and Under the United Nations Refugee Convention: Case Studies of Female Asylum Seekers from 
Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq and Somalia, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 198 (2010) (explaining that U.S. 
asylum law does not officially recognize gender-related claims, including claims of domestic vio-
lence). 
2019] Domestic Violence Asylum Law and Attorney General Referral 2147 
hough the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA, or the Board) has recognized 
domestic violence as a ground for asylum, it has done so only narrowly, and in 
several cases protective precedent has been quickly overturned or under-
mined.9 This dearth of protection, combined with the Attorney General’s unfet-
tered ability to refer immigration cases to himself, leaves domestic violence 
victims seeking asylum at risk.10 
This Note explores the implications of Jeff Sessions’ 2018 decision in 
Matter of A-B- and argues that the decision reveals the inherent danger of the 
Attorney General’s unchecked referral authority in the absence of substantive 
legal protections for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.11 In response, 
this Note proposes the introduction of greater procedural protections, including 
a required notice-and-comment period, to limit the Attorney General’s power 
to effectively legislate human rights issues without input from the legal com-
munity.12 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the development of fed-
eral and state laws to protect victims of domestic violence.13 It also explores 
the Attorney General’s referral authority over immigration matters.14 Further, it 
discusses the dearth of parallel immigration laws protecting domestic violence 
victims seeking asylum and provides a brief overview of the holding in A-B-.15 
Part II explores the implications of A-B- for domestic violence victims seeking 
asylum in the United States.16 Finally, Part III proposes the introduction of 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding narrowly that 
young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been 
subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice are 
eligible for asylum); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906, 917, 919 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Att’y 
Gen. Jan. 19, 2001, remanded 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (B.I.A. 2005), stay lifted 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 
(B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting asylum eligibility for “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimate-
ly with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination” 
but vacated just two years later by the Attorney General). See generally Blaine Bookey, Domestic 
Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 
2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107 (2013) (providing a thorough overview of outcomes of asylum 
claims based on domestic violence between 1994 and 2012 and explaining that successful applicants 
typically narrowed the basis for their persecution by combining factors like nationality, gender, and 
feminist opinion). 
 10 See infra notes 63–176 and accompanying text. The Attorney General has the authority to refer 
cases issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA, or the Board) to himself for review and ad-
judication. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018). I use the male pronoun here because U.S. Attorneys 
General have been overwhelmingly male. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorneys General of the United 
States, https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios [https://perma.cc/837W-ME7F]. Only two of the 
eighty-five Attorneys General have been female, with Janet Reno acting under President Clinton from 
1993 to 2001 and Loretta Lynch acting under President Obama from 2015 to 2017. Id. 
 11 See infra notes 18–220 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 221–269 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 18–62 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 63–102 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 103–176 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 177–220 and accompanying text. 
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procedural reform to limit the broad use of the Attorney General’s referral au-
thority.17 
I. THE LIMITS OF U.S. LAW IN PROTECTING VICTIMS  
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Starting in the 1960s, the United States embarked on a slow journey to-
ward recognizing domestic violence as a public, rather than a private con-
cern.18 Although the concept of domestic violence in the American psyche con-
tinues to waver between these two spheres, the United States has nonetheless 
signified a firm commitment to protecting victims by enacting widespread leg-
islation and allocating significant law enforcement resources toward tackling 
this problem.19 In contrast, this commitment does not extend to individuals 
seeking asylum in the United States.20 Section A of this Part details the devel-
opment of U.S. laws protecting domestic violence victims and the social con-
text that gave way to their enactment.21 Section B explores the Attorney Gen-
eral’s role in the immigration realm and discusses the historical use of the re-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 221–269 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 7–8 (explaining the transformation from when the United States 
viewed domestic violence as a private concern to now, when the broad recognition of the structural 
nature of domestic violence demands a state response). Of course, the 1960s and 1970s feminist 
movement had its roots in earlier gender-related rights movements like the suffragette movement of 
the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century. See Linda Nicholson, Feminism in “Waves”: Useful 
Metaphor or Not?, in FEMINIST THEORY READER: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 49, 49 (Carole 
R. McCann & Seung-Kyung Kim eds., 2013) (explaining that these earlier movements paved the way 
for the success of feminist activism in the United States in the 1960s); Olivia B. Waxman, The Sur-
prisingly Complex Link Between Prohibition and Women’s Rights, TIME (Jan. 18, 2019), http://time.
com/5501680/prohibition-history-feminism-suffrage-metoo [https://perma.cc/VGS6-EW8C] (noting 
that women also played a large role in fueling the movement behind Prohibition, as wives aimed to 
curb rampant domestic violence that resulted when husbands drank in excess). Because this Note 
concerns U.S. asylum law, it primarily explores the distinction between “public” and “private” in the 
American context. It is worth noting, however, that “public” and “private” may carry different mean-
ings outside of the U.S. context. See KIM RUBENSTEIN & KATHARINE G. YOUNG, THE PUBLIC LAW 
OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 9 (2016) (“[W]hat is public in one society may well 
be private in another.”).  
 19 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that state and federal legislation signifies a dedica-
tion to protecting victims of domestic violence). By the 1980s, for example, based on pressure from 
battered women’s advocates, some states enacted changes in arrest policies for domestic violence 
offenders, broadening the circumstances under which police could investigate and prosecutors could 
charge crimes of domestic violence. Sack, supra note 6, at 1668–69. For example, almost every state 
enacted legislation enabling officers to make arrests without a warrant in misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence cases, and several states passed laws mandating arrest upon a finding of probable cause that a 
domestic violence incident had occurred. Id. at 1668–70. 
 20 See SARA L. MCKINNON, GENDERED ASYLUM: RACE AND VIOLENCE IN U.S. LAW AND POLI-
TICS 4 (2016) (explaining that asylum law does not recognize gender as an established identity catego-
ry upon which persecution can be based, and that asylum law has allowed “gender to take shape only 
as a contingent and segregated political category”). 
 21 See infra notes 24–62 and accompanying text. 
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ferral authority.22 Finally, Section C discusses the absence of substantive pro-
tections for domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the United States and 
provides an overview of the holding in A-B-.23 
A. A Brief History of the Evolution of U.S. Federal and State Laws 
Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence 
In a 1981 essay, feminist poet Audre Lorde writes: “anger is loaded with 
information and energy.”24 Indeed, peaks of publicized and mobilized outrage 
in the United States—particularly in response to the status of women in socie-
ty—have historically revealed the untenability of such a status and sparked 
change.25 The United States experienced such a peak in 2018—deemed by 
some as the Year of the Woman—as women and men expressed collective an-
ger at rampant sexism and the persistent suppression of women’s voices in so-
ciety.26 At the 2018 Golden Globes, Oprah Winfrey captured precisely the im-
petus driving this spike in outrage, noting that, “for too long, women have not 
been heard or believed . . . .”27 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 63–102 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 103–176 and accompanying text. 
 24 Audre Lorde, The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism, BLACKPAST.ORG (Aug. 12, 
2012), https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/speeches-african-american-history/1981-
audre-lorde-uses-anger-women-responding-racism/ [https://perma.cc/RT4N-QQ6H]. Audre Lorde 
originally published this poem in 1981. Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Casey Cep, The Perils and Possibilities of Anger, NEW YORKER (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/15/the-perils-and-possibilities-of-anger [https://perma.
cc/8MDU-3U43] (describing a “recurring figure in American history: the woman whose activism is 
fueled by anger”). 
 26 Id.; Maya Salam, 2018: Year of the Woman, in 5 Powerful Quotes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/us/women-2018-biggest-stories-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/
K3HR-MFTY] (reporting that 2018 has been referred to as the Year of the Woman); see Jessica Ben-
nett, The ‘Tight Rope’ of Testifying While Female, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/09/28/us/politics/christine-blasey-ford-testimony-testifying-while-female.html [https://
perma.cc/W8RN-4HHB] (describing the “gender dynamics, and mental gymnastics” that women must 
perform to be heard). The year 2018 also marked the height of the #MeToo movement, which began 
in late 2017 in response to news about Harvey Weinstein’s decades-long abusive behavior toward 
women and the secret settlements that urged them to keep quiet. See Vasundhara Prasad, Note, If 
Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regu-
lating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2510–11 (2018) 
(detailing the evolution and rapid expansion of the global #MeToo movement). Further, the year 2018 
saw a second Women’s March—attracting thousands of people—that echoed the 2017 Women’s 
March protesting President Trump’s policies and rhetoric. Women’s March 2018: Protesters Take to 
the Streets for the Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Women’s March 
2018], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/us/womens-march.html [https://perma.cc/26CJ-FNQR]. 
 27 Oprah Winfrey, Golden Globe Awards (NBC television broadcast Jan. 7, 2018). Unfortunately, 
this is not a new sentiment, as it also surfaced in the 1991 confirmation of Judge Clarence Thomas. See 
Julia Jacobs, Anita Hill’s Testimony and Other Key Moments from the Clarence Thomas Hearings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/us/politics/anita-hill-testimony-clarence-
thomas.html [https://perma.cc/23CQ-G69S] (describing lawmakers’ relentless attempts to undermine 
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Like the Year of the Woman, the women’s movement of the 1960s and 
1970s signified a breaking point and sparked dramatic change.28 Up to that 
time, U.S. law and policy had approached domestic violence as a private con-
cern, largely falling outside the scope of state intervention.29 Following a 
common law tradition, laws and policymakers favored the protection of priva-
cy rights and avoided intruding on family life.30 For example, under the 1962 
Model Penal Code, a man could not commit the crime of rape against his 
wife.31 The women’s movement sparked a national discussion about the preva-
lence of spousal abuse and other forms of domestic violence, and it ultimately 
played an enormous role in forcing legislative change.32 
                                                                                                                           
Anita Hill’s testimony about Judge Thomas’s repeated harassment by calling her “delusional” and 
“somewhat unstable”). 
 28 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 7–8 (detailing a shift in the U.S. conception of domestic violence as 
a public, rather than a private concern as a result of feminist activism in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 29 Id.; see LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 9 (2012) (“In 1970, if your husband slapped, punched, kicked, or otherwise hurt you in some 
way, you had little recourse.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (tracing the historical roots of the American conception of domestic 
violence as private back to the common law concept of chastisement, which granted a husband the 
right to discipline his wife as long as he did not permanently injure her). Even later, into the early 
nineteenth century, courts upheld this right so long as the husband used a “switch no thicker than his 
thumb.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 27 (1989). 
This metric became known as the “rule of thumb,” now a popular expression quite divorced from its 
violent origins. Kenneth Keniston, Wife Beating and the Rule of Thumb, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/08/books/wife-beating-and-the-rule-of-thumb.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2P8-8BFA]. The common law doctrine of coverture also supported husbands’ 
ability to punish their wives. See Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the 
Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra 
note 5, at 11, 19–21 (explaining that under common law, a woman upon marriage became a feme cov-
ert, “protected” by the merging of her legal identity with that of her husband). The coverture doctrine 
and the “rule of thumb” served to normalize violence against women in the home and to reinforce 
patriarchal family dynamics. Id. 
 31 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1373, 1375–77 (2000) (explaining that the drafters of the Model Penal Code were in favor of the 
common law marital rape exemption because they did not want penal law to infringe on family law, 
and exploring early challenges to this exception dating back to the mid-nineteenth century); Sonya A. 
Adamo, Note, The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption: A Survey of Common Law Countries, 4 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 555, 566–67 & n.64 (1989) (noting that the 1962 Model Penal Code immunized 
married men from prosecution for rape, and that commentators to the Code reasoned that the prior 
relationship of marriage creates a general presumption of consent). 
 32 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 9–10 (explaining the role of the women’s movement in securing 
changes in state and federal legislation to protect victims of domestic violence); Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 589, 626 (1986) (explaining that women’s interests historically occupied the private sphere, and 
that the women’s movement secured public recognition of these issues and corresponding legal pro-
tection for women). Certainly, factors beyond the women’s movement also contributed to the intro-
duction of new legislation. See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging 
the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 199, 211 (2008) (describ-
ing a tough-on crime mentality that drove legislative advancements and fervent prosecution); Siegel, 
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The definition of domestic violence, also termed “intimate partner vio-
lence,” is far from fixed.33 Thus, it is worth defining the term as explored in 
this Note and identifying those most commonly affected.34 According to the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), domestic violence encompasses felony or 
misdemeanor violent crimes committed by an individual in one of several rela-
tionships with the victim.35 The perpetrator could be a current or former spouse 
or intimate partner, could share a child with the victim, or could cohabitate 
with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner.36 More broadly, domestic vio-
lence can be physical, sexual, or psychological in nature, and it can occur be-
tween heterosexual and same-sex couples.37 Although men can be victims of 
domestic violence, women experience it far more often than men.38 
In the 1960s and 1970s, feminist advocates brought the issue of domestic 
violence to the attention of lawmakers and urged them to upend archaic no-
tions of domestic violence as a private, family matter.39 In the following dec-
ades, many states introduced both civil and criminal remedies for victims of 
domestic violence, slowly acknowledging the state’s role in intervening to pro-
tect victims.40 As legislation progressed through the 1980s and 1990s, the 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 30, at 2138–41 (describing the historically racialized nature of domestic violence prosecu-
tions, contextualizing it in a “racially hostile criminal justice system,” and noting that in the nineteenth 
century, assault law was primarily enforced against immigrants and African-American men). 
 33 See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (noting variations in the definition of “domestic vio-
lence” that consider factors such as whether or not the victim reports the abuse, whether the abuse was 
physical or emotional, and how far the definition should extend temporally). The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention refers to domestic violence as “intimate partner violence.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, Prevent Domestic Violence in Your Community (Oct. 3, 2018), https://
www.cdc.gov/features/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html [https://perma.cc/XNH9-66SL]. 
 34 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Domestic Violence (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.
gov/ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/MQQ6-NPL7]. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, Intimate Partner Violence (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nij.gov/
topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQW5-QBX9]. Rela-
tively recent scholarship has also framed gender-based intimate partner violence as a means through 
which partners establish power hierarchies. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GENDER VIOLENCE: A CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE 3 (2009). For example, a batterer may use violence to demonstrate to his wife or partner 
that he controls her or to show other men that he is in control. Id. 
 38 See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 7, at 10 (reporting that in the United States, one out of ten 
women experiences rape by an intimate partner during her lifetime, and around 16.9% of women, as 
compared with 8% of men, experience other forms of sexual violence by an intimate partner in their 
lifetime); see also Siegel, supra note 30, at 2189–91 (discussing a shift after the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in Craig v. Boren to use gender-neutral language in domestic violence statutes). 
 39 See Kohn, supra note 32, at 195–98 (detailing the advent of the recognition of domestic vio-
lence as a state concern); see also RHODE, supra note 30, at 20 (describing the status of women in the 
mid-nineteenth century: “[p]aradoxically, the paternalism that justified confining women to the home 
did not extend to protecting them within it”). 
 40 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 46, 62 (1992) (explaining that by 1983, forty-three states and the District of Colum-
bia had introduced legislation protecting victims of domestic violence). Before states became involved 
2152 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2145 
United States strengthened arrest policies and prosecutors began to pursue do-
mestic violence cases with vigor.41 
This nationwide, state-level response ultimately led to the passage of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994, which authorized increased 
funding for domestic violence prosecution and law enforcement, and for non-
governmental victim advocacy groups.42 VAWA also recognized the unique 
vulnerability of undocumented immigrant women in the United States, and it 
provided avenues for domestic violence victims to gain lawful status and seek 
protection without fear of deportation.43 Renewed several times since its first 
passage, VAWA also created the U visa in 2000, available to immigrant victims 
of serious crimes, such as domestic violence, if they agree to aid law enforce-
ment.44 By enacting a series of substantive state and federal laws, the United 
                                                                                                                           
through legislation, advocates opened shelters and safe houses for battered women, independent of 
state intervention. Sack, supra note 6, at 1666. 
 41 See Sack, supra note 6, at 1669–74 (explaining that as domestic violence arrests increased, 
prosecutors instituted more aggressive prosecutorial methods such as mandatory arrests and “no drop” 
policies, which forced prosecutors to proceed regardless of whether the victim wanted the case to 
proceed). In some cases, this excessive vigor produced a negative impact on the victim, with law en-
forcement more focused on prosecutions and jail time than on victims’ wishes. Id. at 1678–80 (detail-
ing the critique that women are “revictimized” by aggressive prosecution strategies that strip victims 
of their ability to decide whether to pursue the case and may increase the risk of violent retaliation); 
see Zorza, supra note 40, at 53 (explaining that proposed legislation, shelters for battered women, and 
other approaches would have little effect without police enforcement); see also NAT’L INST. OF JUS-
TICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RE-
SEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 36 (2009) (reporting that routine 
prosecution of domestic violence cases has become common, although there are still disparities across 
jurisdictions in the prosecution of these cases). 
 42 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40,001-40,003, 108 Stat. 1796, 
1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). One section of the 
Act, for example, enables the Attorney General to “award grants to increase the availability of civil 
and criminal legal assistance necessary to provide effective aid to adult and youth victims of domestic 
violence . . . who are seeking relief in legal matters relating to or arising out of that abuse or violence.” 
34 U.S.C. § 20121(a) (2018). But see Sack, supra note 6, at 1675–76 (detailing criticisms of VAWA 
on the part of victims and those involved in the battered women’s movement). 
 43 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 10–12 (explaining that VAWA enabled victims of domestic vio-
lence to “self-petition” without the approval of the abusive spouse or parent); Leslye E. Orloff & 
Janice Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A 
History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 99–101, 105–11 (2002) 
(describing the evolution of immigration law from historically harming immigrant victims of domestic 
violence to VAWA, which was structured to restore power to victims). Immigrant women, particularly 
those who are undocumented, are at increased risk of abuse because of their reliance on their partners 
for support, and, in the past, to acquire legal status or remain in the United States. See MERRY, supra 
note 37, at 117 (“The threat of deportation is a powerful weapon for an abuser.”). 
 44 Rabin, supra note 5, at 11–12. The U visa applies to victims of particular crimes who have 
experienced physical or mental abuse and are willing to help law enforcement or the government in 
investigating or prosecuting criminal activity. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Victims of 
Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status (June 12, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-
criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/TJG9-LFSL]. The creation of the U visa 
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States demonstrated its commitment to protecting victims of domestic violence 
within its borders and to aggressively prosecuting perpetrators.45 
Despite this legislative commitment, the Supreme Court has grappled 
with this divide between public and private.46 Some scholars argue that the 
Court has undermined the notion of domestic violence as a public concern 
worthy of national attention.47 Just as the women’s movement began to gain 
strength, the Supreme Court, in 1965, held that the Constitution protects a right 
to marital privacy and struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of 
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut.48 Although the case did not deal di-
rectly with domestic violence, its rationale that the state should not intervene in 
the private realm affirmed the sharp distinction between the public and private 
spheres that has historically left battered women vulnerable.49 
In the 1970s, as the Supreme Court began to apply a more stringent 
standard of review to sex discrimination cases, the Court chipped away at the 
separate spheres ideology that had historically relegated women to the private 
sphere.50 In 1976, in Craig v. Boren, the Court elevated the rational basis 
standard traditionally applied to sex discrimination cases and held that to be 
constitutional, sex-based classifications must have a substantial relationship to 
an important governmental purpose.51 With its decision in Craig, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
aimed not only to provide greater protection to victims, but also to enhance the ability of law en-
forcement to investigate and prosecute in domestic violence cases. Id. 
 45 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 9–10, 13 (noting that both legal and non-legal measures provided 
by the state to combat domestic violence were essential in enabling women to “make their private 
suffering public”). 
 46 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Confrontation and the Re-Privatization of Domestic Violence, 
113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 32, 35–37, 42 (2014), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1151&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/PPC7-XVCN] 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Michigan v. Bryant, in articulating a hierarchy of 
violence using domestic violence as a marker, undermined decades of successful law reform efforts to 
overcome the notion of domestic violence as a private concern). 
 47 See id.; see also Schneider, supra note 5, at 36 (explaining the unintended impact of Griswold v. 
Connecticut on victims of domestic violence). 
 48 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); see Schneider, supra note 5, at 36–37 (describing the momentum 
of the battered women’s movement and its success in making domestic violence a visible, public issue 
during the 1970s and 1980s). 
 49 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86; see Schneider, supra note 5, at 36 (arguing that the notion of 
marital privacy protected by Griswold has traditionally been the primary explanation for why the state 
will not intervene to help victims of violence in intimate relationships). Indeed, the Court describes 
marital bedrooms as “sacred precincts” immune from police intervention, suggesting that violence 
occurring inside such a space may likewise be immune. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“Would 
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms . . . ? The very idea is repulsive 
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). 
 50 See Williams, supra note 5, at 154 (explaining that the Supreme Court began to repudiate the 
separate spheres ideology as it tackled sex discrimination cases in the 1970s). 
 51 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). In Craig, the Court considered whether an Oklahoma law pro-
hibiting the sale of beer to men under twenty-one and women under eighteen violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 191–92. In holding that the statute did, indeed, 
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renounced the separate spheres ideology, which was based on the notion that 
women belong in the home and men belong at work.52 
A few decades later, however, the Court took a step backward.53 In its 
2000 decision in United States v. Morrison, the Court voided the VAWA provi-
sion enabling women to sue their abusers in federal court.54 In Morrison, writ-
ing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Rehnquist depicted domestic violence as 
a local concern, rather than a national concern, arguably underplaying its wide-
spread prevalence and re-framing the issue as a family matter.55 
In 2005, the Court again faced an opportunity to characterize domestic 
violence in its joint decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 
both cases exploring the testimonial nature of statements to law enforcement in 
                                                                                                                           
violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court adopted a standard of review in sex discrimination 
cases that fell somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny. See id. at 197–99 (citing Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for the proposition that sex-based statutory classifications require scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause, and noting that, in the wake of Reed, “increasingly outdated mis-
conceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of 
ideas’ were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes 
that were premised upon their accuracy”). In Equal Protection cases, courts apply three primary stand-
ards of review: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Randall R. Kelso, 
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Pro-
tecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 228 & nn.16–18 (2002) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 529 (1997)). To overcome rational basis review, the government must prove only 
that the law is “rationally related” to a “legitimate government purpose.” Id. at 228 n.16. Under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, the law must be “substantially related” to an “important government 
purpose.” Id. at 228 n.17. Finally, under the strict scrutiny standard, the use of a challenged classifica-
tion must be “necessary” to advance a “compelling government interest.” Id. at 228 n.18. 
 52 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98; see Williams, supra note 5, at 154 (arguing that Craig v. Boren 
struck down sex discrimination based on “the old breadwinner-homemaker, master-dependent dichot-
omy inherent in the separate spheres ideology”). 
 53 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000) (voiding a key VAWA provision). 
 54 Id. at 601–02, 625–27 (explaining that the VAWA provision at issue, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981, provides a civil remedy for victims of violence motivated by gender). In Morrison, Justice 
Rehnquist held that violence against women does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
and asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield against merely private conduct . . . .” 
Id. at 613, 619, 621; see Rabin, supra note 5, at 54 (describing the effect of Morrison as framing do-
mestic violence as a family matter, rather than a problem worthy of national attention). 
 55 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is 
truly national and what is truly local.”). In a vigorous and thorough dissent, Justice Souter cited a 
litany of statistics demonstrating the prevalence of domestic violence and argued that VAWA re-
sponded to precisely the notion that crimes of domestic violence were less serious than other crimes 
by instituting a national response in the form of federal legislation. Id. at 628–36, 654 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[VAWA] is intended to respond both to the underlying attitude that this violence is 
somehow less serious than other crime and to the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to 
address such violence.”). Justice Souter also analogized the systemic nature of domestic violence to 
that of racial discrimination in the 1960s, and contrasted the Court’s response in Katzenbach v. 
McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States with its response in this case. Id. at 635–
36. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2000) (arguing that Morrison represents a refusal to permit Congress to 
rectify violence against women and leaves battered women without recourse). 
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the wake of incidents of domestic violence.56 In Davis, the Court reasoned that 
if the statements were made after the emergency had ended, they were consid-
ered testimonial and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause barred their 
admission.57 In Hammon, the Court held that the victim’s statements to a po-
lice officer after the incident were, indeed, testimonial because the emergency 
had ended.58 Arguably, this determination minimized the ongoing and perva-
sive nature of domestic violence, which often operates through persistent, es-
calating coercion that leaves victims living in constant fear.59 
The Supreme Court has certainly vacillated in its conception of the state’s 
role in intervening in private matters, and indeed in what exactly constitutes a 
“private matter.”60 Despite these inconsistencies, the substantive legal protec-
tions for domestic violence victims in the United States remain strong and em-
body an enduring commitment to protecting victims.61 The same cannot be 
said in the realm of asylum law, where the concept of domestic violence as a 
public concern lacks stable footing.62 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817–21 (2006) (recounting the facts in both the Davis and 
Hammon cases). In Davis, the Court held that a victim’s statements to a 911 operator made while her 
former boyfriend actively attacked her were made during the course of an ongoing emergency and 
thus were not testimonial. Id. at 817–19, 826–28. In Hammon, the Court held that a victim’s state-
ments to police after the attacker had left the premises were not made during an ongoing emergency 
and thus were testimonial. Id. at 819–21, 829–30. 
 57 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to bar the admission in a criminal trial 
of evidence considered testimonial in nature. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). In 
Davis, the Court held that to assess whether a statement is testimonial, courts should apply a primary 
purpose test to distinguish between statements aimed primarily to assist a criminal investigation and 
those aimed primarily to resolve an ongoing emergency. 547 U.S. at 822. Statements made in the 
course of an ongoing emergency are not considered testimonial, and so the Confrontation Clause does 
not bar their admission. Id. 
 58 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829–30 (determining the testimonial nature of the statements in both Ham-
mon and Davis). 
 59 See id.; Tuerkheimer, supra note 46, at 42 (positing that the Court’s analyses in Davis and 
Hammon derived from the domestic nature of the incidents). 
 60 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield 
against merely private conduct . . . .”). 
 61 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 8, 9–11 (explaining, for example, that today every state has civil 
protection orders in place and many have criminal sanctions for those who refuse to comply). 
 62 See Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and 
Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE 
SURV. Q. 46, 47 (2010) (noting that although the Obama Administration may have been more willing 
to recognize gender-based asylum claims—for example, based on domestic violence—there is an 
absence of U.S. precedent and jurisprudence to establish the basis for such claims). 
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B. The Unique and Powerful Impact of the Attorney General’s  
Referral Authority 
1. The Attorney General’s Role as Head of the Department of Justice 
Despite efforts over the last fifty years to engender a national recognition 
of the prevalence of domestic violence and shift the problem definitively into 
the public sphere, the United States has yet to securely apply the same logic in 
asylum law.63 This, however, is not for lack of effort on the part of victims and 
advocates.64 In the realm of immigration, precedential cases typically issue 
from one of two sources: The BIA or a federal appeals court.65 A third source, 
though rarely invoked, is the Attorney General’s referral authority.66 As the 
head of the DOJ, the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of 
the federal government.67 In conjunction with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Attorney General is also responsible for the administration 
and enforcement of U.S. immigration law.68 To aid in this endeavor, the Attor-
ney General has the authority to appoint up to twenty-one BIA judges who act 
as his delegates.69 Although the BIA has the ability to exercise independent 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. (lamenting a “dearth of [U.S.] jurisprudence to establish applicable norms” for deter-
mining gender-based asylum claims, including claims based on domestic violence). 
 64 See, e.g., Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89, 392–95 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding 
that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” are eligible for asy-
lum). Four years later, Attorney General Jeff Sessions overruled this case in Matter of A-B-. 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316, 339–40 (A.G. 2018); Stuart Anderson, The Sessions Asylum Decision: What Are Its Impli-
cations?, FORBES (June 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/06/13/the-
sessions-asylum-decision-what-are-its-implications/#15098d96776b [https://perma.cc/KER2-EBRT] 
(explaining that immigration court judges and BIA judges “had utilized their expertise in immigration 
law over the past decades to arrive at the current state of asylum law” with respect to domestic vio-
lence victims seeking asylum). 
 65 The BIA falls under the DOJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1. An adjudicatory body of up to twenty-one 
attorneys, the BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to hear immigration cases, and its decisions are binding 
unless overturned by the Attorney General or a federal court. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://
perma.cc/9PU8-28FE]. For a noncitizen faced with a removal order, initial removal proceedings occur 
before an administrative immigration court judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a). An appeal of this decision can 
be filed with the BIA, the highest level of administrative review for immigration matters. Id. § 1003.1(b). 
A noncitizen seeking further review must file an appeal in federal court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2018). 
 66 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i); Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive 
Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
841, 901 (2016) (noting that the use of the referral authority over the past fifty years has been rare). 
The referral authority is also sometimes termed “certification power,” as the Attorney General has the 
power to “certify” cases to himself. See Gonzales & Glen, supra, at 853 (referring to the authority 
interchangeably as the referral and certification power). 
 67 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Office of the Attorney General, https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office 
[https://perma.cc/YE7S-NXBN]. 
 68 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (g) (2018). 
 69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note 65; see Gonzales & Glen, 
supra note 66, at 849–50 (explaining that since the BIA’s formation in 1940, it has operated as the 
Attorney General’s delegate without existing independently in any statute). 
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judgment in its adjudication of cases, it derives its authority solely from regu-
lations provided by the Attorney General.70 Thus, as it stands, the combination 
of executive branch structure and the current statutory scheme governing im-
migration law endows the Attorney General with expansive power over immi-
gration law and policy.71 
In line with this broad authority, the Attorney General has the ability to 
refer cases issued by the BIA to himself for review and adjudication.72 The 
regulations do not specify any limits on the kinds of cases the Attorney Gen-
eral can review, and they do not mandate specific referral procedures; instead, 
they simply outline the actors that can refer cases to the Attorney General.73 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1), the BIA must refer for review all cases if: (1) 
the Attorney General requests a referral, (2) the BIA Chairman or a BIA major-
ity believes the case should be referred to the Attorney General, or (3) the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security or a designated DHS official refers the case to the 
Attorney General.74 
The ability of an agency head—like the Attorney General—to review the 
decisions of an intermediate appellate tribunal—like the BIA—is by no means 
novel in administrative law.75 Agency head review can be an effective means 
to ensure agency control over policy and consistency in agency adjudication.76 
Indeed, as head of the DOJ, the Attorney General straddles the political and 
adjudicatory realms, playing both a policy-making and judicial role.77 As such, 
he is less burdened by the administrative, procedural requirements binding the 
BIA and less constrained by political pressure and public visibility than the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 850. 
 71 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323 (“[T]he extraordinary and pervasive role that the Attorney 
General plays in immigration matters is virtually unique.”). Further, for well over a century, the exec-
utive branch has enjoyed “plenary power” over immigration matters, enabling it to establish policies 
and legislation with Congress without substantial intervention from the judicial branch. See Kevin R. 
Johnson, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: 125 Years of Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 58, 58 & n.1 (2015) (explaining that the notion of plenary power as a means of protect-
ing immigration decisions from judicial review was first introduced by the Supreme Court in 1889 in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States with respect to Chinese exclusion laws). In Chae Chan Ping, the 
Court affirmed the validity of a Congressional act prohibiting certain Chinese laborers from entering 
the United States, amid a growing tide of prejudice toward Chinese immigrants. See 130 U.S. 581, 
595, 609, 611 (1889). 
 72 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). 
 73 Id. § 1003.1(h)(1). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney 
General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1769–70 
(2010) (explaining that agency head review, in itself, is not a controversial practice in administrative 
law). 
 76 Id. at 1770. 
 77 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 867–68 (noting that the Attorney General’s role is both 
legal and policy-oriented; he is both the “final arbiter of legal questions and the ultimate decider as to 
the forms of relief and protection available to aliens under the [Immigration and Nationality Act]”). 
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President.78 The Attorney General’s unrestrained referral authority allows him 
to enact policy reform through the more efficient, definitive route of adjudica-
tion in lieu of notice-and-comment rulemaking.79 
Scholars, however, have noted the benefits of notice-and-comment rule-
making over adjudication for administrative policy making.80 Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act, before issuing a rule, agencies must provide no-
tice of the proposed text and accept public comments.81 Among the primary 
benefits of this avenue, rulemaking enables a more participatory process that is 
fairer to those affected than a rule announced though adjudication of a particu-
lar case.82 Further, rulemaking fosters political accountability by restraining 
the ability of unelected agency heads to create legally binding rules.83 Other 
administrative agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, are re-
quired by statute to resolve certain issues through rulemaking, rather than ad-
judication.84 In the realm of immigration, however, there are no such re-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. 129, 
132 (2016) (discussing the Attorney General’s unique position as not only a political appointee, but 
also a bureaucrat and adjudicator). 
 79 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 898 (arguing that Attorney General review via the 
referral authority is more efficient and certain than regulatory reform). The Administrative Procedure 
Act articulates two primary routes through which administrative agencies can enact policy: rulemak-
ing and adjudication. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–554 (2018). Indeed, in practice, most agencies enact substantial 
policy decisions through either rulemaking or adjudication, although there are other ways to reform 
policy. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 114 (5th ed. 2012). Un-
der 5 U.S.C. § 553, an agency that engages in rulemaking must provide sufficient notice of the pro-
posed rule to the public and allow an opportunity for the public to comment on the proposed rule. 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). General notice of a proposed rule is typically published in the Federal Register, 
and it includes information regarding (1) the time, place, and nature of proceedings, (2) the legal au-
thority supporting the proposal rule, and (3) the proposed rule’s terms or a description of the relevant 
issues. Id. § 553(b). Notice-and-comment rulemaking is considered informal rulemaking, as there is 
no requirement of an oral hearing, as in formal rulemaking. LUBBERS, supra, at 251. 
 80 See LUBBERS, supra note 79, at 123 (explaining that most contemporary commentators prefer 
rulemaking over adjudication for agency policy making). 
 81 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 82 LUBBERS, supra note 79, at 123. 
 83 See Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Docu-
ments, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 822 (2010) (explaining that “[a] sizable literature has noted the benefits of 
legislative rules, which include establishing a uniform policy, setting policy ex ante, reducing adjudi-
cation costs, fostering openness and deliberation, [and] increasing political accountability”). 
 84 See LUBBERS, supra note 79, at 115 & n.11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (2012)) (explaining the 
impact of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 on the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires the EPA to “promulgate per-
formance standards for the treatment, storage, or disposal of certain hazardous wastes within 18 
months of the statute’s enactment, following opportunity for public hearing and consultation with 
appropriate federal and state agencies.” Id. at 115 n.11. In one instance, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reprimanded the EPA for attempting to use adjudication in lieu of rule-
making. Id.; see Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1088–89 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that under the 
Clean Air Act, which required the EPA to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking, the EPA could not 
use case-by-case adjudication to decide jurisdictional issues over Indian country regarding federal 
operating permits). 
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strictions on the Attorney General’s ability to eschew this more traditional 
rulemaking process.85 
2. The Historical Use of the Referral Authority and Feasible Procedural 
Limits on This Power 
Although the Attorney General possesses a broad and limitless referral 
authority, Attorneys General in recent history have not invoked this power of-
ten.86 When an Attorney General does utilize the referral authority, however, 
controversy almost always arises.87 Not only have Attorneys General used the 
referral authority to impose new rules and overturn seemingly firm BIA prece-
dent, but they have also frequently done so without adequate warning or input 
from interested parties.88 Further, referral decisions tend to produce results that 
are detrimental to the noncitizen—for example, a denial of relief or a finding 
that the noncitizen is removable—and applicable to entire classes of immi-
grants.89 
In the past, Attorneys General have used the referral authority to resolve 
questions of law, set policy, or establish new frameworks for future decision 
making.90 Some scholars argue that this referral authority can serve as a pow-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 897 (posing the question: “[I]s Attorney General re-
view an adequate substitute for the more traditional avenue of rulemaking?”); see also SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that if Congress has not specified whether an agen-
cy must perform rulemaking or adjudication, the choice between the two procedures “lies primarily in 
the informed discretion of the administrative agency”). 
 86 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 857–58 (explaining that the referral authority was used 
sixteen times total during the eight-year George W. Bush Administration and only four times during 
Barack Obama’s eight years as president). Generally, Attorneys General have used the referral author-
ity less frequently over time, although the rate of review depends on the administration. Id. For exam-
ple, between 1942 and 1952, Attorneys General reviewed nearly thirty-seven cases per year, while 
Attorneys General during the George W. Bush Administration invoked the referral authority an aver-
age of two times per year. Id. Comparatively, the Trump Administration has used the referral authority 
more frequently than previous administrations, invoking it four times in 2018 alone. Asylum Law—
Attorney General’s Certification Power—Attorney General Holds That Salvadoran Woman Fleeing 
Domestic Violence Failed to Establish a Cognizable Particular Social Group—In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 803, 809 (2018) [hereinafter Asylum Law—In re 
A-B-]. 
 87 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 847 (explaining that the referral authority enables the 
Attorney General to “effect profound changes in legal doctrine”); Trice, supra note 75, at 1767–68 
(asserting that the use of the referral authority is almost always controversial). 
 88 Trice, supra note 75, at 1768 (noting that regulations governing the referral authority do not 
require the Attorney General to provide notice of the issues to be reviewed, to give parties a chance to 
be heard, or to invite input from amici on issues of sweeping significance). 
 89 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 859 & n.106 (noting that in 64.47% of the Attorney 
General’s reversals of a BIA decision, the results cut against the noncitizen’s interests); Trice, supra 
note 75, at 1771 (noting that the majority of the Attorney General’s referral decisions “produce signif-
icant changes in the law that directly affect whole classes of immigrants in removal proceedings”). 
 90 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 861 (providing a broad thematic overview of the major 
types of contemporary Attorney General referral decisions). These three categories are illustrative, 
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erful tool to advance executive immigration policy.91 A flexible referral author-
ity, so the argument goes, enables the Attorney General to enact policy without 
a burdensome rulemaking process that can extend for years without resolu-
tion.92 Others critique the authority for its lack of guidelines and for creating a 
structure in which one person can abruptly overrule the decision of a neutral, 
adjudicatory body.93 Indeed, current legislation and regulations do not require 
the Attorney General to follow any uniform procedure in overturning BIA 
precedent.94 The Attorney General is not required to provide minimal notice to 
parties or elicit input from stakeholders, including immigrant advocacy organi-
zations and others directly affected.95 
Despite this absence of procedural requirements, former Attorneys Gen-
eral have voluntarily imposed restrictions on their own referral authority.96 For 
example, during the Obama Administration, Attorney General Eric Holder ex-
ercised particular caution in the two instances in which he used his referral 
authority to overturn BIA precedent.97 Before deciding Matter of Silva-Trevino 
                                                                                                                           
rather than exhaustive, as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not limit the Attorney 
General’s referral authority to any type of case. Id. For example, Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
invoked his referral authority in Matter of J-S- to resolve a question of statutory interpretation regard-
ing whether spouses of noncitizens whose governments had subjected them to coercive population 
control, including involuntary sterilization, were entitled to refugee status on that fact alone. 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 520, 526 (A.G. 2008); Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 863–65. In J-S-, the Attorney Gen-
eral held that the INA’s refugee definition extended only to those who had undergone such coercive 
population control, and not to their spouses. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 530–31. 
 91 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 920–21 (arguing that, as head of the DOJ, the Attorney 
General should use the referral authority more often to efficiently and clearly advance executive poli-
cy goals); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and 
the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 177 (2010) (proposing the use of the Attorney 
General’s referral authority as one mechanism to implement policy change regarding the post-
departure bar to reopening a case). 
 92 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 886–89 (explaining that despite efforts by Attorneys 
General after the BIA’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A- to institute a clear rule regarding asylum 
eligibility for domestic violence victims, still today there is no final rule). 
 93 See, e.g., Margaret Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18, 19 
(2016), https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/Taylor-FinalPublication.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV55-
DRJM] (framing the Attorney General’s referral authority as conflicting with a central tenet of the 
U.S. legal system, structured to ensure that neutral adjudicators decide issues); see also Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1672 (2010) (objecting to 
Attorney General review of adjudicatory decisions while acknowledging that the referral authority is a 
tool to achieve policy coherence without the need for notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 94 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (providing no concrete procedural requirements for the use of the Attor-
ney General’s referral authority); see Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 916 (noting that if the Attor-
ney General uses the referral authority to overturn BIA precedent, he should issue an opinion except 
in the case of “extraordinary countervailing considerations”). 
 95 See Asylum Law—In re A-B-, supra note 86, at 806–07 (noting that although Attorney General 
Eric Holder chose to seek input through a notice-and-comment period, Jeff Sessions did not). 
 96 See, e.g., id. (describing the procedural protections that former Attorney General Eric Holder 
employed while invoking his referral authority). 
 97 Id. 
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in 2015 and Matter of Compean in 2009, Holder either sought public input 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking or awaited developments in federal 
circuit court precedent before intervening.98 Given that his decisions in both 
cases would have sweeping consequences for immigrants in removal proceed-
ings, Holder sought diverse perspectives and a thorough consideration of the 
issues.99 
Like Holder, Attorneys General over the last several decades have in-
voked the referral authority to resolve questions of asylum eligibility and relat-
ed protections.100 Comparatively, Attorneys General under the Trump Admin-
istration have already used the referral authority more frequently than previous 
administrations, invoking it four times in 2018 alone.101 Given the high-stakes 
nature of asylum cases, these referral decisions can have sweeping and imme-
diate effects, both positive and negative, for asylum seekers in the United 
States.102 
C. The Absence of Reliable, Substantive Protections for Victims of Domestic 
Violence Seeking Asylum in the United States 
1. A Turbulent History of Domestic Violence Asylum Cases 
In the United States, recent increases in asylum seekers have sparked con-
tentious debate.103 For some, these rising numbers symbolize a “flood” or “in-
vasion” of “illegal aliens.”104 For others, these individuals are “refugees” flee-
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. In Attorney General Holder’s 2015 decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, he reversed dec-
ades-old precedent defining the term, “crime involving moral turpitude,” a conviction that makes a 
noncitizen inadmissible and thus ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation. 24 I. & N. Dec. 
687, 688–90 (A.G. 2008). In Matter of Compean, Attorney General Holder vacated a decision made 
by former Attorney General Mukasey regarding the standard of review for motions to reopen on ac-
count of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1–3 (A.G. 2009). 
 99 See Asylum Law—In re A-B-, supra note 86, at 807–08 (arguing that, unlike A.G. Sessions, 
Attorney General Holder used the referral authority to seek diverse perspectives). 
 100 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 861–68 (detailing the recent use of the Attorney Gen-
eral referral authority to decide issues of asylum eligibility and related protection). 
 101 Id. at 857; Asylum Law—In re A-B-, supra note 86, at 809. 
 102 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 847 (noting the referral authority’s potential to effect 
“profound changes in legal doctrine”). 
 103 See Maya Rhodan, The Number of Asylum Seekers Has Risen by 2,000% in 10 Years. Who 
Should Get to Stay?, TIME (Nov. 14, 2018), http://time.com/longform/asylum-seekers-border/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q2MB-HSHF] (explaining that the number of asylum seekers has risen from fewer 
than five thousand people in 2008 to over ninety-seven thousand in 2018, and this has polarized im-
migration rights advocates and others who support Trump’s “policy war against asylum seekers”). 
 104 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 249 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (depicting an “ev-
er-increasing flood of illegal aliens”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS Secretary Nielsen’s Re-
marks on the Illegal Immigration Crisis (June 18, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/18/dhs-
secretary-nielsens-remarks-illegal-immigration-crisis [https://perma.cc/5ZJD-W4EY] (describing a 
“flood of illegal immigrants, drugs, contraband, and crime coming across the border”); Newt Gin-
grich, The Caravan Is an Attack on America: Stop the Caravan Now, FOX NEWS (Oct. 19, 2018), 
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ing “humanitarian crises” around the world.105 Indeed, this linguistic disso-
nance embodies a national debate about the proper balance between our inter-
est in preserving state sovereignty and our moral obligation to help others in 
need.106 In drawing lines between those who merit legal protection and those 
who do not, the Unites States must necessarily determine just how far its moral 
obligation extends.107 
The legal protection of asylum in the United States derives from interna-
tional law.108 In the wake of the horrors of World War II, many of the world’s 
leaders assembled in efforts to prevent the reoccurrence of the “barbarous acts 
which . . . outraged the conscience of mankind.”109 In 1948, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
includes the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion.110 Soon after, in 1951, the United Nations Refugee Convention (the Con-
vention) clarified exactly who is eligible for asylum by defining the term “ref-
ugee.”111 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/newt-gingrich-the-caravan-is-an-attack-on-america-stop-the-
caravan-now [https://perma.cc/64PM-K96Y] (portraying the caravan of “illegal immigrants” ap-
proaching the United States to seek asylum as “an invasion of our sovereign border”). 
 105 See, e.g., John Cohen, Why the Trump Administration Let the Border Become a Full-Blown 
Humanitarian Crisis, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/trump-administration-
border-full-blown-humanitarian-crisis-opinion/story?id=59797528 [https://perma.cc/6VRC-363Y] 
(reporting that 281 people had died in 2018 through the date of the article’s publication trying to cross 
the southern border, including 7-year-old Jakelin Caal Maquin, who died of dehydration while in U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection custody). 
 106 See Daniel Kanstroom, Loving Humanity While Accepting Real People, in DRIVEN FROM 
HOME: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF FORCED MIGRANTS 115, 115 (David Hollenbach ed., 2010) (ex-
plaining that discourse surrounding asylum seekers has always been replete with clashes between “gen-
erous obligations to ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ and more restrictive concerns about certain types of peo-
ple”). 
 107 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Lim-
its to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2007) (“Asylum challenges the national conscience in 
distinctive ways. It generates hard questions about our moral responsibilities to fellow humans in 
distress . . . [and] the recognition of human rights and our willingness to give them practical effect 
. . . .”); Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence Are Not 
Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/
sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/7RVF-TDET ] (citing A-B- as “the latest 
turn in a long-running debate over what constitutes a need for asylum”). 
 108 See G.A. RES. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”). 
 109 Id. at pmbl. 
 110 Id. at art 14. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSE-
VELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 143–71 (2001) (detailing the fascinat-
ing history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ drafting, including Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
bold leadership and heated debates between countries about the specific language to be used). 
 111 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RE-
LATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 2–3 (2010), https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [https://
perma.cc/YWF4-5EVV] (describing the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees as “the centrepiece of international refugee protection today”). 
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The Convention and its accompanying 1967 Protocol define a refugee as 
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one 
of five factors: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.112 These post-World War II measures responded to 
the refugee crisis at the time, and thus focused on the factors, like race and re-
ligion, that were considered the most prevalent bases for persecution during 
that era.113 In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act, which incorporated this 
definition into U.S. immigration law.114 Thus, the protection of asylum is 
available to noncitizens in the United States or at the border who meet this def-
inition of “refugee.”115 An applicant for asylum must also prove that either the 
government or a private actor that the government is unable or unwilling to 
control has inflicted the persecution.116 
Given that the Refugee Act fails to specify a multitude of other factors 
that could lead to persecution, “membership in a particular social group” 
serves as a catch-all ground for asylum eligibility.117 To apply for asylum based 
on this ground, victims of gender-based violence—including domestic vio-
lence—must distill the myriad factors that may have accounted for their abuse 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Id. Underpinning the U.N. Refugee Convention is the notion of non-refoulement, providing 
that states should not return or expel refugees involuntarily to a place where they fear “threats to life 
and freedom.” Id. at 3. The 1967 Protocol simply got rid of the geographic limits and time restraints to 
asylum eligibility, as the Convention initially only extended to Europeans displaced because of World 
War II. Bethany Christa Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative Assessment of 
Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361, 364 
(2012). 
 113 CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, supra note 111, at 2. 
 114 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 
22 U.S.C.). 
 115 Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (May 14, 2018), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states [https://perma.cc/36CF-5RRC]. In the 
United States, a grant of asylum confers a range of benefits on the asylee. Karen Musalo et al., The 
Role of Mental Health Professionals in Political Asylum Processing, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
479, 480 (2010). The asylee can bring a spouse or child to the United States, is authorized to work and 
eligible for certain social services, and can eventually become a lawful permanent resident and then a 
U.S. citizen. Id. 
 116 Refugee Act; Matter of Acosta, 9 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (clarifying that after the 
U.S. enactment of the Refugee Act, to fit within the Refugee Act’s definition of persecution, “harm or 
suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization 
that the government was unable or unwilling to control”). 
 117 Refugee Act; see Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 2512, 2517 (2014), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=5648&context=ylj [https://perma.cc/4B5K-N9EJ] (explain-
ing that the drafters of the Convention understood that a single list could not adequately exhaust all 
the possible reasons for persecution). 
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and define their particular social group.118 Typically, these social groups in-
clude sex or gender as just one of the many factors that provoked persecu-
tion.119 For a particular social group to be cognizable under U.S. asylum law, it 
must be defined by a shared “immutable” characteristic.120 In the BIA’s 1985 
decision in Matter of Acosta, it recognized for the first time that sex is an im-
mutable characteristic.121 Since this landmark decision, subsequent asylum 
cases have relied on Acosta to propound the validity of sex as a characteristic 
that could serve as a basis for persecution and thus be protected under asylum 
law.122 Despite the Board’s decision in Acosta, courts still struggled in its wake 
to define “particular social group” with consistency.123 
In 1993, in Fatin v. INS, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit invoked Acosta and held that gender-based persecution could be asy-
lum-worthy.124 A few years later, in 1996, the BIA recognized a gender-defined 
social group in Matter of Kasinga.125 The respondents in both Fatin and 
Kasinga were successful only after enhancing their gender-based asylum 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Lobo, supra note 112, at 367–68. Gender-based violence can manifest in many different 
forms, including domestic violence, female genital mutilation, and honor killings, in which a woman 
who has been unfaithful is murdered to restore her family’s honor. Id. at 381, 396 & n.270. 
 119 Id. at 368. For example, in the 1996 case of Matter of Kasinga, the respondent formed her 
particular social group using not only gender, but also age, tribe membership, geographic location, and 
other aspects of her lived experience. 21 I. & N. at 365 (respondent claiming membership in the par-
ticular social group of young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern 
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who 
oppose the practice). 
 120 See Acosta, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (clarifying that “immutable” extends beyond its literal defi-
nition to encompass a common characteristic “that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscienc-
es”). 
 121 Id. (noting that “[t]he shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex”). 
 122 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1235, 1237–41 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing gendered 
persecution as asylum-worthy and feminism as a political opinion); Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 365. 
 123 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Hand-
book on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, promulgated by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, fails to define the term particular social group); see also id. (finding 
that a “class of young, working class, urban males” of military age was overbroad and not cohesive 
enough to constitute a particular social group); T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular 
Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 923 (1992) (explaining that the legislative history and current judicial and 
agency standards for defining the term “particular social group” are uninformative and inconsistent). 
 124 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239–41. In Fatin, the Third Circuit considered whether “upper class Iranian 
women who supported the Shah of Iran, a group of educated Westernized free-thinking individuals” 
constituted a particular social group. Id. at 1237. The BIA rejected this formulation, but the Third 
Circuit recognized it as a cognizable particular social group. Id. at 1235, 1241. 
 125 Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 365–66. In Kasinga, the asylee claimed membership in the particular 
social group of young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo 
who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose 
the practice. Id. The BIA held, narrowly, that this formulation constituted a cognizable particular 
social group. Id. 
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claims by introducing a variety of other factors besides gender.126 After 
Kasinga, courts began consistently recognizing gender-based violence as fall-
ing within the scope of the Refugee Act and women began to see some success 
with their claims in immigration courts.127 
Despite this momentum, courts refused to define “women” more broadly 
as a particular social group.128 Even though asylum law requires cases to be 
adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, adjudicators feared overextending protect-
ed grounds.129 As a result, doctrine remained unstable and women remained 
vulnerable, especially because the decision to grant asylum is discretionary.130 
This instability ultimately led to the BIA’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A-.131 
In R-A-, the BIA overturned the immigration court’s asylum grant to Rody Al-
varado and rejected her proposed social group of “Guatemalan women who 
have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination.”132 The BIA held that the 
social group was not recognized in Alvarado’s society and that her persecution 
resulted from “tragic personal circumstances.”133 The Board’s reversal seem-
ingly halted years of progress for gender-based asylum claims and threatened 
the future success of domestic violence asylum claims.134 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1237 (respondent defining her particular social group using gender, socioec-
onomic status, political beliefs, and education level); Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 365 (defining the re-
spondent’s particular social group using gender, age, tribe membership, geographic location, and other 
aspects of her lived experience). 
 127 Lobo, supra note 112, at 388 & n.219; see, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental 
Brief, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Brief in Matter of L-R-], https://cgrs.
uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FSX-
H8WJ] (conceding that the respondent, a Mexican woman who had been in an abusive domestic rela-
tionship, could be eligible for asylum and asking the BIA to remand the matter to the Immigration 
Court). During the remanded proceedings, the Department of Homeland Security stipulated to an 
order granting asylum to the respondent. See Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/H9X9-ARA7]. 
 128 Lobo, supra note 112, at 368 (explaining that despite the United States’ recognition of gender-
based particular social groups, it is nonetheless “reluctant to name ‘women’ without any qualifier as 
the particular social group”). 
 129 See id. (describing a fear in the United States of opening “the proverbial floodgates”). 
 130 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(a) (2012) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney Gen-
eral may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and 
procedures . . . .”); Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in 
Claims for Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595, 596 (2012) (explaining that the word “may” in 
§ 208 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158, has been interpreted to grant discretionary power to the 
deciding officer). 
 131 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919. 
 132 Id. at 917. 
 133 Id. at 919. 
 134 Marsden, supra note 117, at 2529 (noting that many believed Matter of R-A- threatened not 
just asylum claims based on domestic violence, but a wide range of other, gender-based asylum claims 
as well). 
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Headed by Attorney General Janet Reno, the DOJ in 2001 proposed rules 
to amend certain asylum eligibility recommendations, largely to reverse partic-
ular aspects of the Board’s decision in R-A-.135 Rather than declare a categori-
cal rule applying the Refugee Act to all domestic violence victims, Reno aimed 
to clarify governing asylum law and expand it to apply more generally.136 In 
2001, the acting Immigration & Naturalization Services Commissioner re-
ferred R-A- to Reno.137 She vacated the case and directed the BIA to stay its 
reconsideration until her proposed rule was fully published.138 Reno’s rule, 
however, was never published.139 Ultimately, in 2008, Attorney General Mi-
chael Mukasey invoked his referral authority to reconsider Alvarado’s claim in 
R-A-.140 Despite the lack of a final rule or precedential decision regarding asy-
lum eligibility for domestic violence victims, Alvarado won asylum in 2009, 
after a decade of uncertainty.141 
Alvarado’s case captured a lingering belief in asylum law that domestic 
violence does not constitute a significant societal issue, and instead should re-
main a personal, private matter.142 Despite the vast, substantive changes in 
state and federal legislation to protect domestic violence victims in the United 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 887–88 (explaining that Attorney General Reno’s rule 
would (1) clarify that applicants need not prove the persecutor would persecute all women in the so-
cial group to establish the nexus and (2) provide “illustrative criteria to meet in order to establish a 
cognizable particular social group”). 
 136 Id. (explaining that the proposed rule clarified that asylum law does not require the applicant 
to prove that her persecutor would persecute all women in the particular social group in order to 
demonstrate the requisite nexus between the social group and the persecution). The rule also included 
a provision explaining that evidence of a persecutor’s desire to persecute other people who share the 
applicant’s characteristic is relevant but not required. Id. Finally, the rule introduced illustrative crite-
ria that an applicant must meet to establish a particular social group. Id. 
 137 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906; Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 888. 
 138 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906; Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 888. 
 139 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 888 (explaining that despite efforts by Attorney General 
Reno, the rule remains unpublished today). 
 140 Id. Five years earlier, in 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft had referred R-A- to himself 
and had ultimately remanded it for the BIA to decide upon publication of the final rule. Id. (noting that 
four years after Attorney General Ashcroft’s referral of the case, this rule still remained unpublished). 
 141 Id. at 889; see also Editorial, Rody Alvarado’s Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/opinion/09mon3.html [https://perma.cc/EC4W-FFZX] (reporting Al-
varado’s grant of asylum after “her case took a tortuous route through immigration courts, where the 
question of asylum for battered women has long been muddled by controversy, indecision and inac-
tion”). As of 2017, Alvarado also became a U.S. citizen. Joel Rose, This Salvadoran Woman Is at the 
Center of the Attorney General’s Asylum Crackdown, NPR (May 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/05/22/611920968/this-salvadoran-woman-is-at-the-center-of-the-attorney-generals-asylum-
crackdown [https://perma.cc/3MJY-SJBD] (reporting that Alvarado’s long but victorious story has 
become an inspiration for women who face uncertainty with respect to their asylum claims). 
 142 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919 (“[F]or ‘social group’ purposes, [Alvarado] has not shown that 
women are expected by society to be abused, or that there are any adverse societal consequences to 
women or their husbands if the women are not abused.”). 
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States, no such changes materialized in asylum law.143 Even with the lack of 
firm precedent, though, victims of domestic violence continued to win asylum 
cases based on a combination of their gender and other factors.144 
In 2014, in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA issued a landmark decision for 
domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the United States.145 In A-R-C-G-, 
the BIA granted asylum to an applicant who claimed membership in the par-
ticular social group “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship.”146 Although its holding was narrow, the Board firmly rec-
ognized domestic violence as a basis for asylum.147 For the first time, asylum 
law provided stable, binding precedent and a clear path for domestic violence 
victims.148 
2. Matter of A-B- Unsettles Recently Established Precedent 
Just four years after the BIA’s decision in A-R-C-G-, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions used his referral authority to explicitly reel back the Board’s 
precedent in that case.149 With his 2018 decision in A-B-, A.G. Sessions dis-
rupted precedent that had resulted from decades-long efforts to establish last-
ing, substantive protections for domestic violence victims.150 
In March 2018, Attorney General Sessions invoked his authority under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) to refer A-B- to himself for review.151 At that time, the re-
spondent (Respondent)—who had fled El Salvador in 2014 after suffering 
years of spousal violence—had already experienced four years of uncertainty 
as her case proceeded through various stages of appeal.152 As the basis of her 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Rabin, supra note 5, at 26 (noting a lack of “binding precedent or clear guidance” for 
domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the United States). 
 144 See, e.g., DHS Brief in Matter of L-R-, supra note 127 (acknowledging that a Mexican woman 
who had been abused by her male partner could be eligible for asylum); see also Bookey, supra note 
9, at 123–24, 130–31 (tracking domestic violence asylum case outcomes between 1994 and 2012, and 
noting that successful social groups combined gender, nationality, links between the applicant and a 
domestic relationship, and feminist opinion). 
 145 See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388. 
 146 Id. at 388–89, 393–94. The respondent in A-R-C-G- suffered years of abuse at the hands of her 
husband. Id. at 389. He beat her, broke her nose on one occasion, threw paint thinner on her, and 
raped her. Id. 
 147 Id. at 392–95 (finding the respondent’s particular social group immutable, socially distinct, 
and defined with sufficient particularity). 
 148 Id. at 391 (noting that the BIA in R-A- attempted but failed to resolve the question of whether 
domestic violence victims could establish membership in a particular social group). 
 149 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316, 323 (overruling A-R-C-G-, “[t]hat decision was wrongly decided 
and should not have been issued as a precedential decision”). 
 150 Id.; see Musalo, supra note 62, at 53–62 (detailing the development of gender-based asylum 
claims in the United States). 
 151 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323. 
 152 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320–23. The respondent (Respondent) in A-B- arrived at the United 
States-Mexico border in July 2014 after fleeing domestic violence in her home country. Id. at 320. She 
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asylum claim, the Respondent had alleged that she had suffered persecution on 
account of her membership in the particular social group of “El Salvadoran 
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have 
children in common” with their partners.153 The Respondent’s particular social 
group closely mirrored that of the respondent in A-R-C-G-, who had been 
granted asylum by the BIA on the basis of her inability to leave a domestic 
violence relationship.154 
In December 2015, however, an immigration judge denied the Respond-
ent’s asylum application, rejecting her proposed particular social group for fail-
ing to meet the criteria outlined by the Immigration and Nationality Act.155 The 
Respondent appealed to the BIA, and in December 2016, the Board reversed 
the immigration judge’s decision.156 In August 2017, however, the immigration 
judge certified the case back to the BIA, noting that several recent federal ap-
peals court decisions had denied relief to domestic violence victims for failure 
to establish asylum eligibility based on membership in a particular social 
group.157 
For example, in 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Velasquez v. Sessions held that the respondent failed to establish a 
nexus between the persecution she had suffered and her membership in a par-
ticular social group.158 In Velasquez, the court characterized the violent custody 
                                                                                                                           
entered the United States without authorization, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection apprehended 
her shortly thereafter. Id. After entering removal proceedings, the Respondent filed an application for 
asylum, among other protections. Id. at 320–21. The Respondent also filed for “withholding of re-
moval under the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3), and for withholding of removal under the regula-
tions implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” Id. 
 153 Id. at 321. In support of her application, the Respondent set forth facts demonstrating that her 
ex-husband, who shares three children with her, had “repeatedly abused her physically, emotionally, 
and sexually during and after their marriage.” Id. 
 154 See id.; A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388–89, 393–95 (recognizing the particular social group 
of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”). 
 155 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321. The immigration judge denied the Respondent’s asylum applica-
tion for three additional reasons: (1) she was not credible, (2) she did not establish that her member-
ship in a particular social group was a central reason for the persecution she experienced, and (3) she 
failed to meet her burden of showing that the government of El Salvador was unable or unwilling to 
help her. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018) (outlining the criteria for establishing a particular 
social group). 
 156 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321 (citing Matter of A-B- (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2016)) (finding that the 
respondent’s proposed particular social group was substantially similar to that of the respondent in 
A-R-C-G-, and thus the respondent in this case had satisfied the particular social group requirement). 
The BIA reversed and remanded the immigration judge’s denial with an order to grant asylum after 
completing background checks. Id. 
 157 Id. at 321–22. 
 158 866 F.3d 188, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2017). In Velasquez, the Honduran respondent had fled intimi-
dation and death threats from the mother of her son’s late father that had resulted from a years-long 
custody battle for her son. Id. at 191–92. The mother kidnapped Velasquez’s son several times and 
threatened to kill Velasquez for refusing to relinquish custody. Id. at 192. Further, the mother’s living 
son killed Velasquez’s sister, mistaking her for Velasquez, according to Velasquez’s mother. Id. As 
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battle at issue as “simply a personal dispute” and asserted that evidence 
demonstrating private violence does not sufficiently establish persecution.159 
The Fourth Circuit also noted broadly that the asylum statute was not meant to 
be a “panacea for the numerous personal altercations that invariably character-
ize economic and social relationships.”160 Given the logic driving Velasquez 
and similar contemporaneous appeals court cases, the immigration judge in 
A-B- reasoned that the BIA’s 2016 decision in A-B- might no longer be valid 
law.161 
Faced with this uncertainty, Jeff Sessions referred A-B- to himself for re-
view.162 Specifically, he aimed to resolve the question of: “[w]hether, and un-
der what circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes 
a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum 
. . . .”163 On this issue, Attorney General Sessions invited the parties and any 
interested amici to submit briefs.164 In his June 2018 decision, A.G. Sessions 
explicitly overturned A-R-C-G- and rejected the particular social group pro-
posed by the Respondent in A-B-.165 
Attorney General Sessions held that the BIA in A-R-C-G- had failed to 
perform the careful analysis required by the precedential decisions establishing 
the framework for the particular social group analysis.166 After chastising the 
BIA’s “cursory analysis,” A.G. Sessions applied the existing framework to the 
                                                                                                                           
the basis for her asylum claim, Velasquez claimed membership in her nuclear family as her particular 
social group. Id. 
 159 Id. at 194, 196–97 (holding that respondent’s case “invokes the type of personal dispute falling 
outside the scope of asylum protection”). 
 160 Id. at 195. 
 161 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 322 (citing Matter of A-B-, Decision and Order of Certification, *3–4 
(Immigration Ct. Aug. 18, 2017)); see, e.g., Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 286, 290–91 (6th Cir. 
2016) (rejecting respondent’s proposed social group: “women who suffer from domestic violence in 
Zimbabwe at the hands of a domestic partner and are unable to leave” for failure to demonstrate im-
mutability); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting respondent’s pro-
posed social group: “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as 
property” for failure to demonstrate immutability and social distinction). 
 162 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. Although Attorney General Sessions received twelve amicus briefs, he did not cite to any 
of their arguments with respect to his proposed question. See generally A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(addressing just two amici concerns over the course of a thirty-one-page decision: (1) regarding due 
process in the certification of the case and (2) concerning a belief that Sessions is advancing policy 
views on immigration issues). 
 165 See id. at 339–40. 
 166 Id. at 340; see Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that an 
applicant seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group must demonstrate that 
their proposed social group is “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable character-
istic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question”); Matter of 
W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 224 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that an applicant seeking asylum based on 
membership in a particular social group must prove that his or her membership in that social group 
was a central reason for the persecution). 
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respondent’s claim in A-R-C-G-.167 He held that: (1) her particular social group 
failed to establish the requisite particularity and social distinction, (2) she 
failed to demonstrate past persecution, and (3) she failed to establish a nexus 
between her social group and her persecution.168 Having overruled A-R-C-G-, 
Attorney General Sessions vacated the BIA’s decision in A-B- as well.169 
In articulating his reasoning, A.G. Sessions drew a sharp distinction be-
tween the abstract victim of private violence and the “prototypical refugee,” 
who flees government persecution.170 He held that immigration adjudicators 
must take particular care in assessing asylum claims brought by victims of 
private violence alleging membership in a particular social group.171 Attorney 
General Sessions also added broadly that claims by victims of domestic vio-
lence committed by private actors will generally fail to qualify for asylum.172 
Echoing the Fourth Circuit’s language in Velasquez, A.G. Sessions proclaimed: 
“the asylum statute does not provide redress for all misfortune.”173 
In a political climate characterized by polarizing rhetoric with respect to 
asylum seekers, Attorney General Sessions’ dramatic pronouncement sparked 
significant reactions from scholars and advocates.174 Many feared that A.G. 
Sessions’ devaluation of private violence signified a return to the “dark ages” 
                                                                                                                           
 167 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 331, 334–40. 
 168 Id. Attorney General Sessions held that the respondent’s social group was not particular be-
cause it did not “exist independently” of the harm asserted. Id. at 334–35. In his view, groups defined 
by vulnerability to private violence are too diffuse and “often come from all segments of society.” Id. 
He found no evidence to support the notion that Guatemalan society views women in the respondent’s 
particular social group as socially distinct. Id. at 336. A.G. Sessions then assessed the respondent’s 
alleged persecution under a three-part test. Id. at 337 (“persecution” must (1) target a belief or charac-
teristic, (2) be severe, and (3) be inflicted by the government or someone the government is unwilling 
or unable to control). He asserted that private criminals act more often because of “greed or vendettas” 
rather than any intent to target a specific group of people. Id. He also held that the respondent’s harm 
was severe, but that victims of private violence must show that the government “demonstrated a com-
plete helplessness to protect the victims” and respondent failed to do so in this case. Id. Finally, Attor-
ney General Sessions held that private criminal actors may have a plethora of reasons to target people, 
and that the respondent did not adequately demonstrate the nexus requirement. Id. at 339. 
 169 Id. at 340. 
 170 Id. at 318. In conceiving of this abstract victim of private violence, Sessions focuses on both 
victims of domestic violence and gang violence. Id. at 320. 
 171 Id. at 340 (“Neither immigration judges nor the Board may avoid the rigorous analysis re-
quired in determining asylum claims, especially where victims of private violence claim persecution 
based on membership in a particular social group.”) (emphasis added). 
 172 Id. at 320. 
 173 Velasquez, 866 F.3d at 195 (“[T]he asylum statute was not intended as a panacea for the nu-
merous personal altercations that invariably characterize economic and social relationships.”); A-B-, 
27 I. & N. Dec. at 318. 
 174 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 64 (predicting that A-B- would result in the return of “signifi-
cant numbers of bona fide refugees” to their persecutors); Gingrich, supra note 104 (describing asy-
lum seekers as “illegal immigrants” carrying out “an invasion of our sovereign border”). 
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or precluded asylum for domestic violence victims entirely.175 Part II of this 
Note examines the validity of these fears and how far Sessions’ decision actu-
ally extends.176 
II. THE IMPACT OF MATTER OF A-B- ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
On the one hand, Jeff Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B- did not drasti-
cally alter the framework for analyzing asylum claims brought by domestic 
violence victims claiming membership in a particular social group.177 On the 
other hand, the decision marked a symbolic return to rhetoric about the private 
nature of domestic violence that has been increasingly suppressed and con-
demned since the women’s movement began its work in the United States in 
the 1960s.178 Section A of this Part explores the limits of A-B- in terms of its 
substantive, legal impact on asylum-seekers alleging persecution in the form of 
private violence.179 Section B examines the symbolic nature of A.G. Sessions’ 
invocation of the Attorney General referral authority to restrict the expansion 
of U.S. asylum protections for domestic violence victims.180 
A. The Limits of Matter of A-B- 
Attorney General Sessions used his referral authority, in part, to clarify 
the standard required for applicants seeking asylum based on membership in a 
particular social group.181 In his decision in A-B-, however, A.G. Sessions 
merely affirmed the existing framework for adjudicating these claims, rather 
than establishing a new one.182 These standards arose from three precedential 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See, e.g., Benner & Dickerson, supra note 107 (“What this decision does is yank us all back to 
the Dark Ages of human rights and women’s human rights and the conceptualization of it . . . .”) 
(quoting Karen Musalo, a defense lawyer who worked the R-A- case); see also id. (positing that the 
decision “effectively closes a major avenue for asylum seekers”). 
 176 See infra notes 177–220 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018); NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., 
MATTER OF A-B-: INFORMATION AND RESOURCES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/
matterofab?q=matter-b-information-and-resources [https://perma.cc/8E5D-B2XK] (arguing that the 
holding of Matter of A-B- itself is narrow, and that “nearly all the damaging language is dicta,” and 
“much of the damage done is a matter of optics, not law”). 
 178 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 5, at 7–8 (explaining how the women’s movement drove reform to 
reframe the issue of domestic violence as a public, rather than a private concern). 
 179 See infra notes 181–200 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 201–220 and accompanying text. 
 181 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323, 340. Indeed, given the ambiguity of the term, “particular social 
group,” courts have grappled with defining its limits since Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980. 
See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the term “par-
ticular social group” is undefined). 
 182 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. For an applicant to establish membership in a particular social 
group, he or she must demonstrate that the group: (1) comprises members who share a common im-
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BIA cases, dating back to 1985, when the Board issued its landmark decision 
in Matter of Acosta and held that members of a particular social group must 
share a common immutable characteristic.183 In 2014, Matter of M-E-V-G- and 
Matter of W-G-R- refined the framework by introducing the requirements of 
particularity and social distinction and requiring applicants to demonstrate that 
their membership in the social group is a central reason for the persecution.184 
In his critique of the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, A.G. Sessions pri-
marily took issue with the Board’s failure to properly apply these standards, 
not with the standards themselves.185 Thus, for advocates advancing asylum 
claims on behalf of domestic violence victims alleging membership in a par-
ticular social group, the foundational legal framework remains unchanged.186 
Further, although A.G. Sessions asserted that A-R-C-G- acknowledged an 
“expansive new category” of refugees fleeing private violence, this claim fails 
to account for existing precedent, dating back to 1985, recognizing gender-
based asylum claims.187 Indeed, although A-R-C-G- set official precedent in 
2014, courts had been applying the law and granting claims based on gen-
dered, private violence well before that case.188 In his opinion in A-B-, Ses-
                                                                                                                           
mutable characteristic, (2) is defined with particularity, and (3) is socially distinct within the society in 
question. Id. Further, the applicant must demonstrate that membership in the social group is one cen-
tral reason for the persecution. Id. 
 183 See Matter of Acosta, 9 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (interpreting particular social 
group to mean a group of persons “all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic”); infra 
note 184 and accompanying text (describing the standards established by Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014)). 
 184 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317; M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237 (holding that an applicant 
seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group must demonstrate that his or her 
proposed social group is “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, 
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question”); W-G-R-, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. at 224 (holding that applicants seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social 
group must prove that their membership in that social group was a central reason for their persecu-
tion). 
 185 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA did not perform the analysis 
required by these precedents, and instead accepted the Department of Homeland Security concessions 
that the respondent was a member of a qualifying social group and her membership was a central 
reason for her persecution. Id. (citing Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389, 390–95 (B.I.A. 
2014)). 
 186 See id. at 317 (affirming the existing framework for assessing asylum claims brought by vic-
tims of private violence based on membership in a particular social group). 
 187 Id. at 319; see, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1237, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing gen-
dered persecution as asylum-worthy and feminism as a political opinion in 1993); Matter of Kasinga, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365, 367 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing a gender-defined social group in 1996); 
Acosta, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (recognizing sex as an immutable characteristic in 1985). 
 188 See, e.g., Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365–66 (applying Acosta to define the boundaries of 
“particular social group”); Bookey, supra note 9, at 123–24 & n.53 (noting that between 1994 and 
2012, successful social group formulations in domestic violence asylum cases included: “Ghanaian 
women who have been intimate with men who believe it is their right to practice force or violence on 
their female companions” in 1997 and “Jordanian women who espouse western values and who are 
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sions did not explain exactly how A-R-C-G- drastically expands the bounds of 
the particular social group category; however, his language echoed political 
rhetoric propounded by the Trump Administration at the time.189 Indeed, A.G. 
Sessions’ critique of A-R-C-G-’s broad interpretation reflects a fear that immi-
grants are flooding U.S. borders and bringing crime with them.190 In fact, At-
torney General Sessions explicitly raised the issue of gang violence in his deci-
sion in A-B-, even though the case itself did not concern gang violence.191 
Analogizing victims of gang violence to victims of domestic violence, Ses-
sions asserted that an asylum applicant alleging persecution in the form of 
gang violence will generally not qualify because his or her social group would 
likely be too diffuse.192 
In part, the fact that Attorney General Sessions chose a case regarding 
domestic violence to restrict the flow of asylum seekers reflects a recognition 
of the prevalence of domestic violence internationally.193 Indeed, Sessions 
conceded at the end of his opinion that he did not mean to minimize the “har-
rowing experiences” of domestic violence victims worldwide.194 A.G. Ses-
sions’ concern, however, that A-R-C-G- has opened the floodgates, is misa-
ligned with the nature of asylum adjudication.195 Asylum cases are determined 
                                                                                                                           
unwilling to live their lives at the mercy of their husbands, their society, and their government and/or 
women who are challenging the traditions of Jordanian society and government” in 1994). 
 189 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 332 (noting that A-R-C-G- can be read as “establishing a broad new 
category of cognizable particular social groups”); see, e.g., Kirk Semple & Mirian Jordan, Migrant 
Caravan of Asylum Seekers Reaches U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/29/world/americas/mexico-caravan-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5TG4-Z87E] (report-
ing on President Trump’s anti-immigrant politics and on Jeff Sessions’ statement that the caravan of 
migrants approaching the United States’ southern border was “a deliberate attempt to undermine our 
laws and overwhelm our system”). 
 190 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335. Just two months before Attorney General Sessions issued A-B-, 
President Trump tweeted about a caravan of Honduran immigrants approaching the border and con-
demned our “[w]eak [l]aws.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2018, 3:49 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/981121409807155200 [https://perma.cc/M68B-
BG6X]; see Semple & Jordan, supra note 189 (reporting that President Trump tweeted in mid-April 
2018 “not to let these large [c]aravans of people into our [c]ountry”). 
 191 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320, 335 (“The mere fact that a country may have problems effective-
ly policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations 
are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.”). 
 192 Id. at 320, 322–23. A.G. Sessions’ concern about expanding refugee eligibility echoes that of 
the BIA in its 1999 decision in In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919–20 (B.I.A. 1999) (positing that 
the respondent’s social group may “fit[] many other victims of spouse abuse” and expressing concern 
that a social group that is too broad “would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition”). 
 193 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 344 (citing the persistence of domestic violence in both El Salvador 
and the United States). 
 194 Id. at 346 (“In reaching these conclusions, I do not minimize the vile abuse that the respondent 
reported she suffered at the hands of her ex-husband.”). 
 195 Id. at 335 (noting that “broad swaths of society” may be vulnerable to private criminal activity 
like domestic violence); see Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“The particular kind of group characteris-
tic that will qualify under [the particular social group formulation] remains to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.”). 
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on a case-by-case basis, with judges taking into account the particular facts and 
circumstances individually, rather than simply categorically.196 Thus, A-B- 
cannot be interpreted as a categorical denial of domestic violence claims.197 
Adjudicators will continue to apply the existing framework, to recognize gen-
der-based claims, and to assess cases on an individual basis.198 A-B- has not 
altered the substantive, legal framework for adjudicating asylum claims based 
on domestic violence.199 In a political climate becoming increasingly hostile to 
immigrants, however, the decision may well give judges license to reduce their 
exercise of favorable discretion with respect to this type of claim.200 
B. The Dangers of Matter of A-B- 
Although Attorney General Sessions’ decision in A-B- did not change the 
legal framework for adjudicating domestic violence asylum claims, the intro-
duction of a heightened standard for domestic violence victims signaled to ad-
judicators to deny these claims except in cases of severe violence.201 A-B-’s 
new standard undermined the case-by-case nature of asylum adjudication and 
reintroduced the debate about the extent of the state’s role in protecting victims 
of private violence.202 For most of U.S. history, courts, law enforcement, and 
Congress either ignored or minimized the impact of domestic violence on 
women.203 Putting privacy on a pedestal, courts drew boundaries with regard to 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
 197 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental 
actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on membership in 
a particular social group . . . .”). 
 198 Id. at 317. 
 199 Id. at 318–19 (affirming the analytical framework developed through precedent such as 
Acosta, M-E-V-G-, and W-G-R-). 
 200 See, e.g., Benner & Dickerson, supra note 107 (expressing concern that A-B- may result in the 
closing of a major avenue for domestic violence victims seeking asylum); Masha Gessen, How the 
Media Normalizes Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, NEW YORKER (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.
newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-the-mainstream-media-normalizes-trumps-anti-immigrant-
rhetoric [https://perma.cc/F96S-3V62] (reporting that President Trump’s rhetoric with respect to the 
large group of central American immigrants approaching the southern U.S. border includes descrip-
tions such as: “criminal aliens,” a “national emergency” and compromising the “safety of every single 
American”). 
 201 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320, 337 (asserting that generally, victims of domestic violence 
will not qualify for asylum). The year 2018 also saw a significant increase in asylum denials across 
the board, increasing from 42% in 2012 to 65% in 2018. Asylum Decisions and Denials Jump in 2018, 
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Nov. 29, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/539/ [https://perma.
cc/X6CT-CL7C]. 
 202 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336 (“[T]here is significant room for doubt that Guatemalan soci-
ety views these women, as horrible as their personal circumstances may be, as members of a distinct 
group in society, rather than each as a victim of a particular abuser in highly individualized circum-
stances.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 30, at 19–21 (explaining that the coverture doctrine and the “rule 
of thumb” served to normalize violence against women in the home and to reinforce patriarchal family 
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state intervention and reinforced the notion of separate spheres.204 These 
boundaries supported the subjugation of women and enabled battering and 
other violence without consequence.205 With his decision in A-B-, Sessions, 
too, draws a distinct boundary.206 A-B- asserts that U.S. asylum protection 
might be available to victims of private violence, but only in the most extreme 
cases.207 This heightened standard—which A.G. Sessions does not extend to 
the other grounds of asylum like race and religion—relies on the notion that 
the state’s role in cases of domestic violence is generally distant—unless, per-
haps, that violence is particularly egregious.208 
A.G. Sessions also elaborated on the requirement that applicants for asy-
lum based on private violence establish a nexus between the particular social 
group and the persecution.209 In the process, Sessions downplayed the systemic 
nature of domestic violence, which the women’s movement fought diligently 
to expose and which VAWA formally recognized in 1994.210 Sessions asserted 
that private violence based on a “personal relationship” or “personal disputes” 
may fail to establish the requisite nexus.211 To support this claim, A.G. Sessions 
cited Matter of R-A-, the BIA’s 1999 case that Attorney General Janet Reno 
vacated in 2001 after the decision incurred widespread criticism.212 In contrast 
to Reno, Sessions invoked his referral authority to reel back protections, rather 
                                                                                                                           
dynamics); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (depicting domestic 
violence as a local, rather than a national concern). 
 204 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (describing marital bedrooms as 
“sacred precincts”). 
 205 See Williams, supra note 5, at 154 (explaining that the Supreme Court did not seriously begin 
to undermine the separate spheres ideology until the 1970s). 
 206 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (“[T]he level of harm must be ‘severe.’”). 
 207 See id. at 320 (“I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never 
serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on membership in a particular social 
group . . . .”). 
 208 See Siegel, supra note 30, at 2118 (noting that the common law principle of chastisement 
granted husbands the right to discipline their wives as long as they did not permanently injure them). 
 209 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338–39. 
 210 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40,001-40,003, 108 Stat. 
1796, 1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.); A-B-, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. at 339 (positing that individual perpetrators of domestic violence may have any number of 
particular reasons for attacking their victims). 
 211 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 339. 
 212 See id. (citing In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (A.G. 2001)) (supporting the proposition 
that the attacker of the respondent in A-R-C-G- may have attacked her simply because of his “preexist-
ing personal relationship” with her rather than because she was a member of a protected particular 
social group); R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 916; CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS PRACTICE ADVISORY 4 (Sept. 12, 2014), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
sites/default/files/DV_Advisory_9-12-2014_FINAL_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4XM-XHZP] (reporting 
that the Board’s decision in R-A- “provoked a firestorm of criticism”). 
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than enforce them.213 This decision endangered countless immigrant women 
seeking asylum based on domestic violence.214 
The United States has recognized the unique vulnerabilities facing immi-
grant women who have been victims of abuse at the hands of their partners.215 
Through its extension of VAWA in 2000 to immigrants, the United States for-
mally expressed a commitment to protecting victims of violence within its 
borders, despite their immigration status.216 With A-B-, in contrast, Attorney 
General Sessions makes clear as the head of the DOJ that the United States is 
unwilling to extend these protections to help those who face persecution out-
side our borders.217 By minimizing the impact of domestic violence and once 
again classifying the problem as “private,” A-B- symbolically captures an un-
willingness on the part of the United States to combat rights violations that 
affect mostly women.218 
The decision in A-B- was possible because of a lack of statutory protec-
tions for a vulnerable population and because of an absence of restrictions on 
the Attorney General’s referral authority.219 Part III of this Note imagines a 
structure in which the U.S. Attorney General cannot so cavalierly legislate is-
sues with vast repercussions for broad classes of vulnerable people.220 
III. A CALL TO CONGRESS 
The widespread anger captured by the 2018 Year of the Woman demands 
reflection.221 Those in power, across all fields, should examine how the struc-
tures in which they operate promote the suppression of women’s voices.222 In-
deed, as Oprah explained at the 2018 Golden Globes, the oppression of women 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323, 339–40. 
 214 See Benner & Dickerson, supra note 107 (expressing concern that A-B- may result in the clos-
ing of a major avenue for domestic violence victims seeking asylum). 
 215 See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 43, at 108–11, 113 (depicting VAWA as a means through 
which to restore power to victims of abuse at the hands of their partners). 
 216 Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, 114 Stat. 1491; see 
Biden, supra note 7 (characterizing VAWA as a recognition of the basic right of women in America to 
“be free from violence and free from fear”). 
 217 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or 
gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”). 
 218 See id.; MERRY, supra note 37, at 77 (describing how in the early 1990s, a transnational 
movement formed to promote the idea that violence against women was a human rights violation 
under international law). 
 219 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323 (“[T]he extraordinary and pervasive role that the Attorney 
General plays in immigration matters is virtually unique.”); MCKINNON, supra note 20, at 4 (explain-
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 220 See infra notes 221–269 and accompanying text. 
 221 See Salam, supra note 26 (explaining that the 2018 Year of the Woman fueled “uprisings 
around the world” from women like Christine Blasey Ford who “pushed fear aside to be heard”). 
 222 See id. 
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“transcends any culture, geography, race, religion, politics, or workplace.”223 
U.S. asylum law should embrace reflection in the wake of the #MeToo move-
ment and the 2018 Women’s March and refuse to remain complacent in the 
face of countless women seeking justice and safety after years of abuse.224 
Matter of A-B- reveals an enormous structural flaw in U.S. asylum law.225 
Currently, the U.S. asylum system endows one powerful, and traditionally 
male, executive with the ability to endanger the lives of countless victims 
without consequence and without input from those impacted.226 Further, it al-
lows this individual to speak improperly for the United States and to endorse 
an outdated conception of domestic violence as a private concern largely im-
mune from state intervention.227 Given the current absence of lasting substan-
tive protections for domestic violence victims seeking asylum, Congress 
should limit the Attorney General’s referral authority.228 
Scholars, of course, have noted the benefits of an unrestricted Attorney 
General referral authority.229 In 2016, former Attorney General Alberto Gonza-
les and Senior Counsel for the Office of Immigration Litigation Patrick Glen 
wrote an article lauding the authority and advocating for its more frequent 
                                                                                                                           
 223 Winfrey, supra note 27. 
 224 See Prasad, supra note 26, at 2510–11 (detailing the evolution and rapid expansion of the 
global #MeToo movement, which began in late 2017 in response to news about Harvey Weinstein’s 
decades-long abusive behavior toward women and the secret settlements that urged them to keep 
quiet); Women’s March 2018, supra note 26 (reporting on the 2018 Women’s March). 
 225 See generally Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
 226 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018) (outlining the Attorney General’s referral authority and 
providing no concrete limits aside from who can refer cases). Although there have been two female 
Attorneys General, men have predominantly occupied this position: eighty-three of the eighty-five 
U.S. Attorneys General have been male. Supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 227 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or 
gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”); supra note 5 and 
accompanying text (describing the historical notion that domestic violence is a private concern and the 
shift in the United States from such a conception to the belief that the state has a meaningful role in 
protecting victims of domestic violence). 
 228 See, e.g., Twibell, supra note 8, at 198 (explaining that U.S. asylum law fails to provide a 
systematic recognition of gender-related claims, such as claims of persecution in the form of domestic 
violence). Although this Note focuses primarily on increasing procedural protections to counterbal-
ance a lack of substantive protections, that is certainly not to say that lawmakers and advocates should 
ignore the dearth of substantive protections in place for domestic violence asylum seekers. See Lobo, 
supra note 112, at 368. Indeed, Congress should continue to explore increasing substantive protec-
tions, perhaps—as scholars have argued—by adding gender itself to the list of protected grounds or 
recognizing that “women” comprise a particular social group. See id.; Melanie Randall, Refugee Law 
and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches 
to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 290 
(2002). 
 229 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 847, 920 (describing the Attorney General referral 
authority as a powerful mechanism through which the executive branch can advance immigration 
reform, especially with a divided Congress). 
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use.230 The pair of DOJ veterans even concluded their lengthy article on a wist-
ful note, leaving the reader to ponder the future of the referral authority: “[a]ll 
that is to be seen is whether its promise is fulfilled in the coming years.”231 We 
cannot be sure whether this article, specifically, emboldened Attorney General 
Sessions to refer A-B- to himself; however, Gonzales and Glen do make a 
compelling case.232 
As they argue, the referral authority has historically aided in clarifying 
and advancing immigration policy through the executive branch.233 Where 
rulemaking can extend for years without resolution, Attorney General review is 
swift and decisive.234 Although the referral authority has more often produced 
unfavorable decision for noncitizens, it can also be used for good.235 In 2001, 
for example, this authority enabled Attorney General Reno to vacate the BIA’s 
denial in Matter of R-A-, a case that many viewed with repulsion given the hor-
rific abuse suffered by the respondent.236 Undoubtedly, immigrant rights advo-
cates considered this vacatur and the respondent’s ultimate asylum grant a vic-
tory for domestic violence victims.237 Much has changed, however, in the near-
ly two decades since Attorney General Reno’s decision.238 In 2018, the risks of 
an unrestrained referral authority—most notably its potential for abuse—
outweigh the rewards where human rights are at issue.239 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See generally id. (providing a history of the referral authority’s use by former Attorneys Gen-
eral and addressing criticisms leveled at the authority itself). 
 231 Id. at 921. 
 232 See id. at 920 (noting that comprehensive legislative immigration reform seems unlikely, and 
the referral authority could be an effective mechanism through which to advance immigration reform). 
 233 See id. at 897 (arguing that Attorneys General have used the referral authority to create analyt-
ical frameworks and provide “clear, cogent, and definitive legal or policy prescription for immigration 
officials”). But see Taylor, supra note 93, at 35 (arguing that invocations of the referral authority, 
especially during presidential transitions, can lead to a “chaotic development of law and policy across 
presidential administrations”). 
 234 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 898 (noting that Attorney General review is more 
certain and efficient than regulatory reform). 
 235 See id. (explaining that, “in theory the Attorney General should act in a neutral manner to 
advance the legal interpretation or policy prescription he deems appropriate, given all relevant fac-
tors”). But see Shah, supra note 78, at 138 (noting that it is in the minority of instances in which the 
Attorney General has used the referral authority to promote the interests of noncitizens). 
 236 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 888–90. 
 237 See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, Matter of R-A-, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-r-a- [https://perma.cc/68HU-H5FD] (explaining that Rody Alvarado’s grant of asylum 
“opened doors for other women, despite the absence of legal norms and regulations in this area of 
asylum law”). 
 238 See, e.g., Francis Wilkinson, Why Trump Deports Fewer Immigrants Than Obama, BLOOM-
BERG (May 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-15/trump-is-deporting-
fewer-immigrants-than-obama-did [https://perma.cc/UZ5Q-7N7V] (reporting that President Obama’s 
administration strongly enforced immigration law, earning Obama the nickname “deporter in chief,” 
and that President Trump has employed scare tactics and broader discretion in targeting immigrants). 
 239 See Taylor, supra note 93, at 35 (describing Attorney General review during presidential tran-
sitions as a “duck, bob, and weave” route to developing and entrenching policy before ceding power). 
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Although many presidential administrations have aimed to curb immigra-
tion through executive branch authority, perhaps none has been as brazen and 
polarizing as the Trump Administration.240 Indeed, as a candidate, Donald 
Trump ran on an anti-immigrant platform, casting immigrants as “rapists” and 
“bad hombres.”241 Just one week after his inauguration in January 2017, Presi-
dent Trump issued an executive order banning citizens of seven countries from 
entering the United States regardless of their visa statuses.242 More recently, 
Trump’s demands for funding to build a wall between the United States and 
Mexico led to the longest government shutdown in U.S. history.243 These bold 
uses of executive power have highlighted the danger of a lack of restrictions on 
executive authority, especially in the realm of immigration, where executive 
decisions can yield far-reaching and devastating consequences.244 
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N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-
government-shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/M32U-7CRX] (reporting that the government shutdown 
starting on December 22, 2018 lasted thirty-four days, far exceeding the second longest government 
shutdown in history, which occurred during Clinton’s presidency and lasted twenty-one days). 
 244 See Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 197, 200 (2019), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/
02/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Srikantiah-Sinnar.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9D2-XDTL] (explaining that the poli-
cies proposed by the Trump Administration “represent the most wide-ranging Executive Branch at-
tempt to restrict immigration policies in generations”); Emily Bazelon, How Do We Contend with 
Trump’s Defiance of ‘Norms’?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/
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In response, immigrant rights advocates and others across the United 
States have become more vocal with respect to their views on immigration.245 
As with the women’s movement in the 1960s and 1970s, activists are express-
ing outrage at our current system and demanding change.246 In effect, they are 
asking to have a voice in the process of deciding who belongs in the United 
States.247 By imposing procedural constraints on the exercise of the Attorney 
General’s referral authority, Congress would create a more participatory pro-
cess that reflects a greater number of voices.248 
Given the current, complete lack of constraints on the Attorney General’s 
referral authority, Congress could enact reform in a variety of ways.249 As a 
basic measure, it could introduce a set of standards for the use of the authori-
ty.250 For example, Congress could require the Attorney General to provide 
notice to the parties of intent to refer a case, notice upon actual referral, and a 
clarification of the actual issues to be resolved through referral.251 This basic 
requirement of notice would enhance the transparency of these proceedings 
                                                                                                                           
travel-ban.html?action=click&module=inline&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/M9CS-FZBH] (de-
scribing the INA statute authorizing President Trump to issue the “Travel Ban” as “breathtakingly 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/migrant-girl-dead-border-patrol.html [https://perma.
cc/4SD7-UYZG] (reporting on the death of a seven-year-old Guatemalan girl named Jakelin Caal 
Maquin, who died in the midst of overwhelming criticism of the Trump Administration’s zero toler-
ance policy, which separated migrant children from their parents at the border). 
 245 See, e.g., Dakin Andone, Coast-to-Coast Protests Denounce Trump Immigration Policies, 
CNN (June 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/30/us/june-30-immigration-protests/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J7EY-YEWM] (reporting that hundreds of marches and rallies occurred throughout 
the United States to protest family detentions and separations). 
 246 See id. (reporting that protesters carried signs at immigrant rights rallies, some proclaiming 
“[w]e are all immigrants” and “[l]et our children dream [and] [l]et them go!”); see also Rabin, supra 
note 5, at 7–8 (explaining that advocacy from the battered women’s movement in the 1960s and 1970s 
revealed the flaws in a legal system that conceived of domestic violence as a private concern and 
demanded change). 
 247 See Andone, supra note 245 (detailing one protester’s beliefs about President Trump’s child 
separation policy: “Trump’s policy is cruelty personified and we [all] need to speak out against it”). 
 248 See Asylum Law—In re A-B-, supra note 86, at 807–08 (explaining that under President 
Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder used his referral authority to gain diverse perspectives on legal 
issues, soliciting input through a notice-and-comment period or waiting for circuit courts to develop 
precedent so that a neutral, adjudicatory body, rather than an individual executive, could resolve the 
issue). 
 249 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (providing no concrete limits on the Attorney General’s referral authority 
aside from who can refer cases). 
 250 See Shah, supra note 78, at 139 (detailing the benefits of standardizing norms with respect to 
the Attorney General’s referral authority by creating uniform procedures governing its use). 
 251 See Trice, supra note 75, at 1797–98 (proposing that the Attorney General adopt procedures 
requiring notice to the parties and the opportunity to request oral argument and submit briefing). 
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and promote political accountability.252 Congress could also establish a con-
sistent role for the attorneys involved and enable interested parties to submit 
briefing and comments.253 This comments process would help ensure the At-
torney General is fully informed before issuing a decision, as in A-B-, with 
repercussions for a broad class of people.254 A notice-and-comment require-
ment for the use of the referral authority would decrease the striking ease with 
which the Attorney General can reverse precedent without input from the peo-
ple impacted.255 
To be sure, as advocates of the Attorney General’s referral authority, for-
mer Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Patrick Glen respond to the idea 
of introducing procedural safeguards.256 They posit that suggestions to increase 
procedure “are premised mostly on superficial gains in the optics of refer-
ral.”257 Even momentarily conceding this point, optics are vitally important in 
asylum law.258 When the United States extends or withdraws protections for 
asylum seekers, it makes a statement about what kind of country it wants to 
be.259 The Attorney General’s ability to both reel back and grant rights to asy-
lum seekers without restraint clashes with America’s commitment to democra-
cy.260 Gonzales and Glen also note that arguments in favor of greater procedure 
arise only when a decision is reached that is contrary to the interests of noncit-
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izens.261 Indeed, this unsurprising response reflects an aversion to the idea of a 
branch of our government exceeding its authority to reel back individual 
rights.262 
To promote the fair and democratic use of the Attorney General’s referral 
authority, Congress should introduce uniform procedural safeguards.263 Greater 
procedural protections, including a required notice-and-comment period, 
would promote a participatory process and curb the Attorney General’s dan-
gerous ability to overturn precedent resulting from hard-fought community 
efforts.264 The Attorney General’s decision in A-B- does not reflect community 
consensus.265 Advocates have responded fervently, already challenging the 
constitutionality of the decision.266 In the meantime, countless domestic vio-
lence victims have been exposed to great risk.267 Where gender-related rights 
within the United States are increasingly at risk, inaction could lead to the con-
tinued chipping away of rights and the restoration of the notion of domestic 
violence as “private.”268 Congress should impose greater procedural protec-
tions, including a required notice-and-comment period, to prevent our Attorney 
General from issuing the next A-B-.269 
                                                                                                                           
 261 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 66, at 912 (noting that arguments in favor of greater proce-
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CONCLUSION 
U.S. asylum law has failed to extend lasting, substantive protections to 
victims of domestic violence seeking refuge. In contrast, the United States has 
expressed a commitment to treating the issue of domestic violence within its 
borders as a serious, public concern and erasing the notion that violence in the 
home is a private issue. In his 2018 decision in Matter of A-B-, Jeff Sessions 
invoked his referral authority to assert that the U.S. government will extend 
protections to victims of domestic violence only in the most severe cases. With 
his decision, A.G. Sessions validates the notion, which ought to be overcome 
by 2018, that domestic violence is a private concern. The decision reveals the 
structural danger in a system that lacks substantive protections and extends 
broad discretion to the Attorney General through the referral authority. This 
current structure should not stand and would benefit greatly from greater pro-
cedural restrictions. A required notice-and-comment period would help protect 
otherwise vulnerable women seeking asylum and promote a democratic system 
for asylum adjudication. 
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